State v. Duncan
309 Neb. 455
| Neb. | 2021Background:
- Dec. 5, 1999: Lucille Bennett was found stabbed to death in her home; no signs of forced entry; several billfolds were found near the body and money orders were cashed after her death.
- Duncan was convicted (2001) of first-degree murder and use of a deadly weapon; key trial evidence included phone calls to his ex-wife Jaahlay Liwaru in which he described the killing, a neighbor placing him nearby, hairs consistent with his dogs, and largely inconclusive DNA evidence at trial.
- Postconviction (2008): Duncan alleged ineffective assistance and police coercion of Liwaru; the district court denied relief and this Court affirmed on procedural grounds.
- Later DNA Testing Act testing on three billfolds: the red and black billfolds produced low-grade mixed DNA profiles analyzed with STRmix; likelihood ratios favored two unknown contributors over Duncan or Bennett, though Duncan could not be definitively excluded on at least one billfold; the white billfold yielded no usable DNA.
- Duncan moved for a new trial under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2101(6) arguing the new DNA was exculpatory; the district court denied relief, concluding the low-grade, inconclusive DNA would not probably have produced a substantially different result when considered with the trial evidence (noting Duncan’s incriminating calls). The court refused to consider non-trial postconviction evidence.
- Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the denial of a new trial.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court erred by excluding evidence developed in 2008 postconviction proceedings from its § 29-2101(6) new-trial analysis | Evidence from 2008 (coercion of Liwaru; alternative suspect) was relevant and should be considered when assessing whether new DNA would have changed the outcome | § 29-2101(6) permits consideration only of newly discovered DNA/similar forensic evidence and evidence admitted at the original trial; other postconviction evidence is not part of the § 29-2101(6) inquiry | Court held exclusion was correct: § 29-2101(6) limits the record to the trial evidence plus newly discovered DNA/similar forensic evidence; non-trial postconviction evidence is not considered |
| Whether the newly obtained DNA results from the billfolds entitled Duncan to a new trial under § 29-2101(6) | Low-grade STRmix results tending to show unknown contributors (and not Duncan) are incompatible with the State’s robbery theory and with Liwaru’s testimony and therefore probably would have produced a substantially different result | DNA was low-grade and inconclusive; Duncan was not definitively excluded on at least one billfold; absence of DNA is not dispositive (many reasons a perpetrator’s DNA may not appear); new results do not undermine strong inculpatory trial evidence (Duncan’s calls, presence, cashed money orders) | Court held DNA was inconclusive and not sufficiently inconsistent with the trial evidence to probably produce a substantially different result; motion for new trial denied |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Buckman, 267 Neb. 505 (2004) (standard for new trial based on newly discovered DNA: whether it probably would have produced a substantially different result at trial)
- State v. Parmar, 283 Neb. 247 (2012) (new DNA excluding defendant warranted new trial where it directly contradicted eyewitness testimony)
- State v. El-Tabech, 269 Neb. 810 (2005) (denial of new trial affirmed where posttesting DNA did not materially alter the circumstantial case presented at trial)
- State v. Myers, 304 Neb. 789 (2020) (absence of a defendant’s DNA on tested items does not preclude presence or guilt)
- State v. Amaya, 305 Neb. 36 (2020) (inconclusive DNA results are insufficient to overcome other credible evidence tying defendant to the crime)
- State v. Oldson, 293 Neb. 718 (2016) (abuse of discretion occurs when a decision rests on untenable or unreasonable grounds)
