State v. Duncan
309 Neb. 455
| Neb. | 2021Background
- In 1999 Lucille Bennett was murdered; Daryle M. Duncan was convicted in 2001 of first-degree murder and use of a deadly weapon and sentenced to life plus 19–20 years. Two billfolds were found near the body; trial physical/DNA evidence was largely inconclusive and the knife excluded Duncan.
- Key trial evidence included testimony from Duncan’s ex-wife, Jaahlay Liwaru, that Duncan called describing the murder and suggested involvement; that testimony was corroborated by others. No witnesses saw Duncan touch the billfolds.
- Duncan’s 2008 postconviction claims (ineffective assistance and alternative suspect theory) were denied; those materials were later asserted in this DNA-based new-trial motion but had not been part of the jury trial.
- Pursuant to the DNA Testing Act, postconviction testing was performed on three billfolds; the red and black billfolds produced low-level mixed profiles analyzed with STRmix. Results favored two unknown contributors over combinations including Duncan or Bennett, but Duncan could not be excluded as a contributor to at least one billfold.
- Duncan moved for a new trial under § 29-2101(6), arguing the new DNA evidence undermined the State’s robbery theory and Liwaru’s testimony; the district court denied the motion, finding the DNA results low-grade/inconclusive and that, considered with trial evidence (not postconviction-only evidence), a new trial was not likely to produce a substantially different result.
Issues
| Issue | Duncan's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court erred by not considering evidence presented in prior (2008) postconviction proceedings when evaluating a §29-2101(6) new-trial motion based on DNA | The court should consider the 2008 postconviction evidence (coercion of Liwaru; alternative suspect) because it is relevant to the weight of the new DNA results | §29-2101(6) permits consideration only of newly discovered DNA (or similar forensic) evidence and the evidence presented at the original trial; postconviction-only evidence is not part of that inquiry | Court correctly limited consideration to trial evidence plus newly discovered DNA; it erred not to include postconviction-only evidence was rejected |
| Whether the DNA testing results entitled Duncan to a new trial under §29-2101(6) (i.e., would probably have produced a substantially different result at trial) | The STRmix results showing unknown contributors (and not affirmatively linking Duncan to the billfolds) undermine the State’s robbery theory and Liwaru’s testimony, making acquittal more likely | The DNA results were low-grade/inconclusive, did not exclude Duncan entirely, and do not contradict Duncan’s admissions and other circumstantial evidence; thus they would not probably change the verdict | District court did not abuse discretion; DNA was inconclusive/low-probative value and, when combined with trial evidence (especially Duncan’s incriminating calls), would not probably have produced a substantially different result |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Buckman, 267 Neb. 505 (2004) (new-trial standard: newly discovered DNA must probably have produced a substantially different result at the former trial)
- State v. Parmar, 283 Neb. 247 (2012) (new DNA that clearly contradicts eyewitness identification can warrant a new trial)
- State v. El-Tabech, 269 Neb. 810 (2005) (denial of new trial affirmed where new DNA was inconclusive and other circumstantial evidence remained strong)
- State v. Myers, 304 Neb. 789 (2020) (absence of a defendant’s DNA on an item does not preclude presence or possession of that item)
- State v. Amaya, 305 Neb. 36 (2020) (nondetection of movant’s DNA is often inconclusive when other credible tying evidence exists)
- State v. Oldson, 293 Neb. 718 (2016) (abuse of discretion standard explained)