State v. Duncan, 2017 Ohio 8103

In 2006 Charles Duncan was convicted by jury of felony murder for the May 6, 2006 killing of his girlfriend and sentenced to "LIFE with the possibility of parole after fifteen (15) years plus a one (1) year firearm specification to be served CONSECUTIVE."
Duncan did not challenge the sentence on direct appeal. The conviction and sentence were otherwise affirmed on direct appeal.
In October 2016 Duncan filed a pro se motion to vacate his sentence, arguing (1) the sentence was void because it imposed post-release control for an offense not subject to it, (2) costs were improperly included in the entry though not pronounced at sentencing, and (3) the sentence imposed was not the statutorily authorized form.
The trial court entered an amended judgment stating Duncan was not subject to post-release control or costs, but otherwise left the original sentence in place.
The sole legal challenge on appeal is whether the trial court erred by sentencing Duncan to "life with the possibility of parole after fifteen years" instead of imposing the indefinite 15 years-to-life term required by R.C. 2929.02(B)(1).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court exceeded its statutory sentencing authority by imposing "life with the possibility of parole after 15 years" rather than an indefinite 15-years-to-life term under R.C. 2929.02(B)(1)	State: wording differs from statute but produces equivalent parole effect; any distinction is immaterial and defendant's motion is untimely	Duncan: sentence is contrary to law (not the statutorily prescribed indefinite term) and therefore void and subject to attack at any time	Court held the trial court exceeded its authority; the sentence was void and remanded for resentencing

State v. Williams, 71 N.E.3d 234 (Ohio 2016) (distinguishes void sentences from correctable sentencing errors and permits review when sentence is contrary to law)
State v. Fischer, 942 N.E.2d 332 (Ohio 2010) (principles on when sentencing errors render a sentence void)
State v. Beasley, 471 N.E.2d 774 (Ohio 1984) (a court may only impose sentences provided by statute; attempts to disregard statutory requirements render the sentence void)
Colegrove v. Burns, 195 N.E.2d 811 (Ohio 1964) (courts cannot substitute a different sentence than that provided by law)
Yonkings v. Wilkinson, 714 N.E.2d 394 (Ohio 1999) (statutory construction principles; meaning of "definite" vs. "indefinite" sentence)
State v. S.R., 589 N.E.2d 1319 (Ohio 1992) (rules for statutory construction cited for interpretation of sentencing statutes)