State v. Duncan
2017 SD 24
| S.D. | 2017Background
- Steven R. Duncan was arrested after a vehicle crash on Sept. 4, 2015, and remained in custody without posting $5,000 bond.
- Lincoln County filed a formal complaint on Sept. 8, 2015; the court performed a paper review, found probable cause, and set bond in Duncan’s absence.
- A grand jury indicted Duncan on Sept. 12, 2015; a part II information later sought to enhance DUI to a felony based on five prior convictions.
- Duncan’s first personal appearance before a judicial officer occurred at arraignment on Oct. 5, 2015; the court set an initial trial date and scheduling order.
- Duncan moved to dismiss for violation of SDCL 23A-44-5.1 (the 180-day rule), arguing the 180-day clock began Sept. 8 (constructive appearance); the circuit court denied the motion.
- Jury convicted Duncan of DUI and following too closely; he was later found to have five prior DUI convictions and sentenced for sixth-offense DUI.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When does the 180-day period under SDCL 23A-44-5.1 commence? | 180 days begins when defendant first appears before a judicial officer on a charging document; State argued first personal appearance was Oct. 5, 2015. | Duncan argued his constructive appearance (paper review and bond-setting on Sept. 8 complaint) constituted a first appearance, so 180 days began Sept. 8. | Court held 180 days begins when the defendant personally appears before a judicial officer on a charging document; Duncan’s first appearance was Oct. 5, 2015, so no violation. |
| Whether constructive appearance can substitute for personal appearance under the 180-day rule | State maintained Sorensen and Hetzel control, requiring an in-court appearance before the 180-day clock starts. | Duncan urged overruling or distinguishing Sorensen/Hetzel and adopting a constructive-appearance rule to avoid gamesmanship by delaying formal charges. | Court declined to overrule; Sorensen and Hetzel remain controlling—no constructive-appearance exception. |
| Relevance of formal complaint filed while defendant in custody | State argued filing a complaint alone does not start the 180-day clock absent personal appearance before a judicial officer. | Duncan argued the existence of a complaint plus statutory rights (Rule 5) support treating Sept. 8 as first appearance. | Court held filing the complaint did not satisfy the second requirement (appearance before a judicial officer); Oct. 5 remained the start date. |
| Whether custody length changes the analysis | State noted custody status does not alter the statutory two-part requirement for commencement. | Duncan emphasized he remained in custody 32 days before appearing and thus was prejudiced by delay. | Court said custody and filing differences do not change clear statutory text or precedent; no different result. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Sorensen, 597 N.W.2d 682 (S.D. 1999) (180-day period commences when defendant appears on a charging document before a judicial officer)
- State v. Hetzel, 598 N.W.2d 867 (S.D. 1999) (same rule applied; indictment appearance, not custody or complaint filing, starts 180-day clock)
- State v. Seaboy, 729 N.W.2d 370 (S.D. 2007) (standard of review: factual findings for clear error; statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)