State v. Dumstrey
859 N.W.2d 138
Wis. Ct. App.2014Background
- Off-duty Officer Dejaríais observed Brett Dumstrey driving erratically and suspected intoxication; he called the police and attempted to identify himself and stop Dumstrey.
- Dumstrey drove to his apartment complex and entered a remote-controlled, underground parking garage; Dejaríais parked partially in the door opening to prevent it from closing and entered the garage.
- On-duty Officer Lichuki arrived; based on observed signs of intoxication and refusals to perform tests, officers arrested Dumstrey for OWI (second offense).
- Dumstrey moved to suppress evidence obtained after the off-duty officer entered the garage, arguing the warrantless entry violated the Fourth Amendment; the circuit court denied the motion. Dumstrey pleaded guilty and appealed.
- The narrow legal question presented: whether the apartment-complex parking garage constituted curtilage of Dumstrey’s home (triggering Fourth Amendment protection) or a shared/common area where no reasonable expectation of privacy exists.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was entry into the parking garage a warrantless, unconstitutional search of curtilage? | Garage is part of the home’s curtilage (locked, elevator access, beneath unit); entry without a warrant or exigency violated Fourth Amendment. | Garage was a shared/common area used by many tenants and landlord; no reasonable expectation of privacy, so entry did not implicate curtilage. | The garage was not curtilage; shared use and inability to exclude others mean no reasonable expectation of privacy. Entry did not violate the Fourth Amendment. |
| Does a government trespass onto non-curtilage property trigger Fourth Amendment protection? | (Implicit) Trespass by officer is unlawful and significant even if technical. | Trespassory intrusion matters constitutionally only when it occurs on protected areas (houses, curtilage, effects). | Trespass onto non-curtilage property is not a Fourth Amendment search; Jones and related cases confirm protection is tied to constitutionally protected areas. |
| Which analytical framework controls: Dunn curtilage factors or Katz reasonable-expectation test? | Both apply; curtilage analysis should recognize garage as part of home. | Apply Dunn/Trecroci factors and multiunit common-area precedent to find no reasonable expectation of privacy. | Court applied Dunn and Katz-derived factors and concluded, under totality of circumstances, the garage was not curtilage. |
| Do precedents about shared spaces in multiunit dwellings allow warrantless entry into secured common areas? | Some precedents distinguish attached/private garages and would support curtilage protection. | Numerous federal and state decisions hold tenants lack a legitimate expectation of privacy in common areas (including secured garages/hallways). | Court relied on multiunit common-area precedents to conclude no Fourth Amendment protection for shared parking garage. |
Key Cases Cited
- Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (defining curtilage and protection of the area immediately adjacent to the home)
- United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (articulating four-factor test for curtilage)
- United States v. Cruz-Pagan, 537 F.2d 554 (1st Cir.) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in common condominium parking garage)
- Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (recognizing trespass onto curtilage as a Fourth Amendment search)
- Jones v. United States, 565 U.S. 400 (clarifying trespass theory in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence)