State v. Drommond, 469 P.3d 1056

Background

In August 2005 David Drommond shot and killed his ex-wife, also wounding her father; he later pleaded guilty to aggravated murder in exchange for the State not seeking death. A penalty-phase jury would decide life without parole versus 20-to-life with parole eligibility.
Evidence at sentencing: history of domestic violence, post-divorce mental-health crises, diagnoses by multiple examiners (bipolar disorder and various personality diagnoses), testimony about pre-murder efforts to intimidate Reed, and post-murder statements showing lack of remorse.
Trial counsel presented a neuropsychologist (Dr. Gummow) who testified to bipolar disorder NOS and treatability; counsel did not call four court-appointed competency psychologists and did not investigate or present testimony about the antidepressant Effexor (venlafaxine).
Drommond received a life-without-parole sentence; on appeal he argued ineffective assistance (Effexor and failure to call psychologists), confrontation/hearsay errors at sentencing, improper victim-impact evidence, failure to instruct regarding uncharged crimes, and cumulative error.
The appellate court granted a rule 23B remand limited to findings about Effexor; the remand court found counsel deficient for not investigating Effexor but found no prejudice (Drommond had stopped Effexor by July 2005 and the literature did not tie Effexor to homicidal violence).
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed: it deferred or resolved constitutional questions as harmless or unnecessary and held Drommond failed to show Strickland prejudice or other reversible error.

Issues

Issue	Drommond's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Ineffective assistance — failure to investigate/present Effexor evidence	Counsel should have investigated Effexor’s effects and presented experts to mitigate culpability	Even if investigation was deficient, omitted Effexor evidence would not have changed outcome; rule 23B found no contribution of Effexor at time of homicide	No prejudice under Strickland; no relief (court accepts rule 23B findings)
Ineffective assistance — failure to call court-appointed psychologists	Counsel should have called all four competency evaluators to bolster mitigation	Counsel reasonably chose one expert whose bipolar diagnosis was more favorable and avoided putting damaging personality-disorder diagnoses before jury	Strategy was objectively reasonable; not deficient; claim fails
Right to confrontation at sentencing (hearsay via detective about third-party statements)	Confrontation Clause and Utah Constitution require cross-examination of declarants whose hearsay was introduced	No settled right to confrontation at sentencing; in any event the hearsay was reliable or errors harmless beyond a reasonable doubt	Even assuming a confrontation right, admission of the challenged hearsay was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; no reversal
Victim-impact evidence / due process	Certain testimony and photograph were unduly prejudicial victim-impact evidence violating due process	Much of the complained-of evidence described the crime (not victim-impact); the limited victim-impact testimony (children miss mother) was minimal and not prejudicial	Only the children’s loss was victim-impact; it was moderate and non-prejudicial; no reversal
Instruction on uncharged crimes (Lafferty)	Jury should have been instructed to find uncharged crimes beyond reasonable doubt before considering them in sentencing	Evidence was used to show the nature and circumstances of the charged murder, not as separate aggravating crimes	Lafferty does not apply to evidence used merely to describe the charged crime; trial court did not abuse discretion in refusing the instruction
Cumulative error doctrine	Combined trial errors require a new penalty-phase trial	Errors were either unsupported, harmless, or not prejudicial; Drommond failed to brief cumulative-effect analysis	Argument inadequately briefed; court affirms on the merits and for lack of adequate analysis

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two-prong ineffective-assistance test)
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (sentencing may consider out-of-court information without confrontation under due process precedent)
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (limits admissibility of testimonial hearsay absent prior opportunity for cross-examination)
State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988) (uncharged-crimes used as aggravating factors require proof beyond a reasonable doubt)
State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629 (Utah 1995) (discusses confrontation and admissibility at resentencing/sentencing)
State v. Timmerman, 218 P.3d 590 (Utah 2009) (Confrontation Clause applies to trial proceedings; discussion of limits)
State v. Maestas, 299 P.3d 892 (Utah 2012) (addresses victim-impact admissibility and harmless error in penalty phase)
State v. Kell, 61 P.3d 1019 (Utah 2002) (harmless-error approach to sentencing evidentiary issues)
Gregg v. State, 279 P.3d 396 (Utah 2012) (assessing whether omitted mitigation would affect the entire evidentiary picture under Strickland)