State v. Dreewes, 432 P.3d 795

Background

Jennifer Dreewes posted and messaged others to find the person who used her credit card; she identified a Marysville residence and offered $300 to Michelle Thomas and Don Parrish to retrieve her property, injure the pink-haired woman ("Ness"/Marty), and bring her to Dreewes.
Thomas and Parrish went to the residence armed, forcibly entered, threatened occupants with guns, and Parrish aimed and pulled the trigger at Marty; the attack was thwarted by a gun safety and occupants' resistance; Parrish was detained by residents and police arrived.
Facebook and phone records showed extensive communications between Dreewes and Thomas before and after the event; the jury was shown messages directing coparticipants to "nab her and run," and to be armed.
The jury convicted Dreewes as an accomplice to first degree burglary and as an accomplice to second degree assault with a deadly weapon; a special verdict found she was armed with a firearm.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the burglary conviction but reversed the accomplice second degree assault conviction, reasoning that under the law of the case doctrine the State had assumed the burden to prove the victim named in the to-convict instruction and had not met it as to Dreewes' knowledge.
The State petitioned the Washington Supreme Court, which granted review on the sufficiency/accomplice issue and Dreewes separately sought sealing of portions of appellate briefs concerning her financial information; the Court of Appeals had denied sealing and that denial was reviewed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the State's assumed burden under the law-of-the-case (from an unobjected-to "to convict" instruction naming the victim) required proof that Dreewes knew the specific victim (Marty) would be assaulted	State: law-of-the-case did not change accomplice proof; only required that a coparticipant committed the assault and that Dreewes solicited/aided it	Dreewes: under law-of-the-case the State assumed burden to prove the named-victim element and thus failed to show she knew Marty would be assaulted	The court reversed Court of Appeals; law-of-the-case burden did not alter accomplice liability rules—State could prove accomplice liability by showing a coparticipant assaulted Marty and Dreewes had general knowledge and solicited/aided the crime
Whether accomplice liability requires specific knowledge of every element of the principal's offense	State: accomplice need only general knowledge of the substantive crime, not specific knowledge of each element or identity of particular victim	Dreewes: argued she lacked knowledge that Marty (the named victim) would be assaulted with a deadly weapon	Court: affirmed long-standing rule—accomplice liability requires general knowledge of the crime; specific knowledge of elements or victim identity is unnecessary
Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain an accomplice conviction for second degree assault with a deadly weapon	State: evidence (messages, payment offer, instructions to be armed, directing to abduct/injure, post-event directions) allowed reasonable inference Dreewes solicited and aided the assault	Dreewes: argued insufficiency because she lacked specific knowledge about Marty being the assault target	Court: evidence sufficed; reasonable jurors could find Dreewes solicited/aided and had general knowledge of the armed forcible scheme, supporting accomplice assault conviction
Whether portions of the State's response brief and Dreewes' reply brief containing financial information should be sealed on appeal	Dreewes: GR 15(g) and privacy concerns warrant sealing since material derives from sealed dissolution records and concerns her financial status/ability to pay costs	State: opposed sealing; public interest in open administration and oversight of public funds outweighs privacy claim; redaction, not sealing, is the least restrictive means	Court: affirmed Court of Appeals—denied sealing; Ishikawa factors not met (no serious and imminent threat shown), redaction available, public interest predominant

Key Cases Cited

State v. Johnson, 188 Wn.2d 742 (2017) (law-of-the-case rule requires the State to prove every element in the unobjected-to to-convict instruction beyond a reasonable doubt)
State v. Hickman, 135 Wn.2d 97 (1998) (unchallenged jury instructions become law of the case)
State v. Roberts, 142 Wn.2d 471 (2000) (accomplice need not have specific knowledge of every element of the principal's crime)
State v. Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d 51 (1991) (accomplice statute predicates liability on general knowledge of the crime, not specific element knowledge)
State v. Rice, 102 Wn.2d 120 (1984) (when liability is predicated on accomplice statute, State must prove only accomplice's general knowledge)
State v. Teal, 152 Wn.2d 333 (2004) (accomplice liability need not be listed as an element in the to-convict instruction and may be given in a separate instruction)
State v. Walker, 182 Wn.2d 463 (2015) (accomplice theory allows splitting elements among participants; jury may find intent in one participant and act in another)
State v. Guloy, 104 Wn.2d 412 (1985) (accomplice statute implies principal and accomplice need not share the same mental state)
State v. Trout, 125 Wn. App. 403 (2005) (affirming accomplice convictions where victims/object changed from plan; general knowledge of armed forcible scheme supported liability)