State v. DR
239 Or. App. 576
| Or. Ct. App. | 2010Background
- Appellant D.R. was adjudicated mentally ill and committed to the Oregon Health Authority under ORS 426.130(1)(b)(C).
- The trial court found clear and convincing evidence of danger to self due to a mental disorder (bipolar) and inability to engage in voluntary treatment.
- On the day of admission, appellant exhibited disorganized, distractible behavior, inconsistent with taking medications, and dangerous driving conduct.
- There was testimony that appellant crossed a street with head down, ran red lights/stop signs, and exhibited impulsive, unsafe-driving behavior.
- Two examiners diagnosed bipolar disorder; one examiner supported commitment, explaining lack of insight and impaired judgment in driving safety.
- The court concluded the danger to self was present and that commitment should be for up to 60 days; appellant appealed challenging the danger-to-self finding.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was appellant a danger to herself under ORS 426.005(1)(e)? | D.R. had a mental disorder causing self-harm risk and unsafe behavior; pattern of dangerous conduct supported by evidence. | No proven nexus between disorder and driving; insufficient likelihood of future harm. | Yes; evidence supports danger to self by a rational trier of fact. |
| Did the State prove a nexus between mental disorder and driving danger? | Disorder impaired judgment and focus, directly contributing to dangerous driving on the day. | No explicit causal link shown between disorder and day-of-driving incidents. | Sufficient nexus shown; conduct tied to disorder and future risk. |
| Was there a sufficient pattern or likelihood of future danger to justify commitment? | Past episodes and current functioning indicated continued risk absent intervention. | Isolated day of risky conduct cannot establish ongoing danger. | Combined past and present deficiencies demonstrated near-term danger to self. |
| Was the decision to commit proper given voluntary-treatment feasibility? | Defendant cannot reliably consent or participate in voluntary treatment due to impairment. | Appellant was amenable to voluntary treatment; commitment should be avoided if possible. | Not dispositive; evidence supported commitment for danger to self; voluntary-treatment feasibility not controlling. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Lott, 202 Or. App. 329, 122 P.3d 97 (2005) (establishes evidentiary standards for predicting future dangerousness)
- State v. Olsen, 208 Or. App. 686, 145 P.3d 350 (2006) (past acts require pattern and continuation to prove danger to self)
- State v. Simon, 180 Or. App. 255, 42 P.3d 374 (2002) (predicting future dangerousness linked to mental illness is complex)
- State v. Roberts, 183 Or. App. 520, 52 P.3d 1123 (2002) (mere wandering or nonharmful past conduct not sufficient alone)
- State v. Siebold, 100 Or. App. 365, 786 P.2d 219 (1990) (distraction leading to a single accident insufficient for danger to self)
- State v. Hambleton, 202 Or. App. 526, 123 P.3d 370 (2005) (isolated risky acts without prior pattern unlikely to show danger)
- State v. Fletcher, 60 Or. App. 623, 654 P.2d 1121 (1982) (driving misconduct alone may be insufficient without more)
- State v. M. R., 225 Or. App. 569, 202 P.3d 221 (2009) (contextual standard for evaluating dangerousness in self)
