State v. Dowdy, 2012 WI 12

Dowdy was charged in 2002 with second-degree sexual assault and found guilty after a jury trial.
Sentencing in 2002 included 15 years imprisonment, stayed, with a 10-year probation term and various conditions.
Dowdy sought modification of probation length in 2009 and again in 2010; the circuit court held a hearing and later reduced probation from 10 to 7 years.
The State appealed, arguing the circuit court lacked statutory or inherent authority to reduce the probation length; the court of appeals agreed.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that § 973.09(3)(a) does not authorize reducing probation length, interpreting it to allow only extension or modification of terms.
The majority declined to decide whether inherent authority to reduce length exists and remanded/affirmed the court of appeals on statutory grounds.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(a) authorize reducing probation length?	Dowdy argued it implicitly allows reduction by 'modifying' terms.	Dowdy argued statute permits reducing length as part of 'modifying terms and conditions'.	No statutory authority to reduce length.
If statutory authority is absent, does inherent authority permit reduction of probation length?	Dowdy contends circuit courts have inherent power to reduce length.	State asserts no inherent authority or different scope than sentencing.	Unresolved by majority; not dispositive to result.
If inherent authority exists, what standard governs reduction of probation length?	Dowdy would apply a 'for cause' standard akin to § 973.09(3)(a).	State argues for a standard like sentence modification (new factor).	Majority rejects an outright 'new factor' standard; would delay finalization; relies on statutory context to limit or allow extension or modification rather than reduction.
Did the circuit court properly exercise discretion in reducing Dowdy's probation length?	Dowdy's rehabilitation progress and risk assessment supported reduction.	State contends lack of statutory/inherent authority and harm to probation purposes.	Not necessary to decide due to statutory bar; court affirmed the court of appeals on statutory grounds.

State v. Crochiere, 273 Wis. 2d 57 (2004 WI 78) (inherent authority to modify or extend probation; context for 'new factor' in sentencing)
State v. Huggett, 83 Wis. 2d 790 (1978) (probation extension related to period, not reducing length)
State v. Sepulveda, 119 Wis. 2d 546 (1984) (probation modification/duration discussion within penal context)
State v. Edwards, 74 Wis. 2d 79 (1976) (probation goals: rehabilitation and protection of society; modification principles)
State v. Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 637 (1999) (probationary powers and separation of powers; probation as alternative to sentencing)