State v. Dooley, 491 P.3d 1250

Dooley pled guilty to failing to register as an offender and received a 120-month sentence, with 36 months probation and intensive supervision conditions (including keeping all appointments).
Multiple probation modifications and short jail sanctions were imposed for unauthorized moves and drug use.
The State moved to revoke probation after repeated admissions and positive tests for controlled substances, a failure to enter the required halfway house (Oxford House), failure to report to community corrections, and failure to provide an address; a warrant issued and Dooley later surrendered.
The district court revoked probation as an absconder and ordered execution of the original sentence; the Court of Appeals affirmed.
On prior review (Dooley I), the Kansas Supreme Court remanded, instructing the district court to either impose intermediate sanctions or make a substantial-competent-evidence finding that Dooley had absconded under K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 22-3716(c)(8).
On remand the court found Dooley had intentionally evaded supervision (based on failing to enter the halfway house, not reporting whereabouts, and missing intake), concluded he absconded, and again revoked probation; the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a probationer "absconds" so court may bypass intermediate sanctions under K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 22-3716(c)(8)	Absconding requires proof that the probationer engaged in conduct with conscious intent to hide from or evade legal process; Dooley's failures satisfy that standard	Missing one meeting, remaining in-city, and surrendering within a month do not show intent to evade; intermediate sanctions should apply	Court adopts intent-focused test (from Robbins and Dooley I); applied to facts, the pattern of failures permitted an inference of conscious intent to evade, so absconding was proven
Whether substantial competent evidence supported finding Dooley absconded	The combination of failing to enter Oxford House, failing to report whereabouts, failing intake, and other violations show a pattern from which intent to evade may be inferred	Dooley argued he was homeless, attempted admission, "got scared," missed one meeting, and voluntarily surrendered—insufficient to prove absconding	Court held the cumulative facts constituted substantial competent evidence to infer intentional evasion and sustained revocation

State v. Dooley, 308 Kan. 641, 423 P.3d 469 (Kan. 2018) (establishing remand standard and discussing absconding standard under K.S.A. 22-3716)
State v. Robbins, 345 Or. 28, 188 P.3d 262 (Or. 2008) (adopted definition of "abscond" emphasizing conscious intent to evade legal process)
Gannon v. State, 303 Kan. 682, 368 P.3d 1024 (Kan. 2016) (explaining appellate standards for mixed questions of fact and law)
State v. Clapp, 308 Kan. 976, 425 P.3d 605 (Kan. 2018) (legislative purpose behind graduated intermediate sanctions)