State v. Dolinar, 319 Neb. 565

Jacob Edward Dolinar was charged with various drug offenses, first in county court, then in district court via information filed on November 16, 2021.
Dolinar initially pleaded not guilty, then withdrew his plea to file a plea in bar, which was overruled; Dolinar appealed that decision, and the appellate court affirmed.
After remand, Dolinar again pleaded not guilty; a trial was set for June 24, 2024, but before that, Dolinar filed a motion for absolute discharge, alleging violation of statutory speedy trial rights.
At the hearing, the district court took judicial notice of the court's files and records; the State did not introduce explicit evidence but relied on judicial notice and argument.
The district court calculated excludable periods and found that sufficient time was excluded; it also found Dolinar had waived the right to a speedy trial by requesting a continuance that extended beyond the 6-month statutory period.
Dolinar appealed, arguing the State failed to meet its burden to show sufficient excludable time.

Issue	Dolinar's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Does § 29-1207(3) restart the 6-month period after interlocutory appeal?	§ 29-1207(3) does not apply to interlocutory appeals where no trial has yet occurred.	Ultimately concurred—does not apply when no trial has occurred yet.	§ 29-1207(3) inapplicable since Dolinar was never tried before.
Application of waiver provision for continuances under § 29-1207(4)(b).	His plea in bar and related actions should not constitute waiver.	District court incorrectly applied Mortensen but result is supportable.	Court need not resolve if plea in bar is covered; Dolinar plainly waived speedy trial by earlier request for continuance past statutory period.
Whether judicial notice of court records suffices for excludable period calculations.	Each relevant motion/ruling must be physically marked and in evidence.	Judicial notice is allowed; no need to itemize if record is clear and uncontested.	Judicial notice of uncontroverted court records is sufficient.
Did Dolinar's motion for continuance in March 2022 result in permanent waiver of speedy trial rights?	No permanent waiver.	Yes, waiver occurred when defendant-requested continuance moved trial date past 6-month deadline.	Waiver occurred; Dolinar lost right to discharge.

State v. Mortensen, 287 Neb. 158 (Neb. 2014) (filing a motion for discharge can result in permanent waiver of speedy trial rights if it delays trial past statutory period)
State v. Baker, 264 Neb. 867 (Neb. 2002) ("tried again" under speedy trial statute only applies if defendant was previously tried)
State v. Williams, 277 Neb. 133 (Neb. 2009) (requiring trial courts to make detailed findings for each excludable period in speedy trial analysis)
State v. Nelson, 313 Neb. 464 (Neb. 2023) (standards of appellate review for speedy trial and statutory interpretation issues)