State v. Dixon and Matienzo
217 So. 3d 1115
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Two consolidated appeals: State sought prohibition, certiorari, and mandamus challenging a trial judge’s practice of sua sponte releasing defendants (ROR or $1 bond) if the State had not filed formal charges by the 21st day after arrest.
- In State v. Matienzo the judge released/reduced bond sua sponte on the 21st day despite: a non‑bondable armed home invasion charge, multiple related felony cases, and the State filing an information about an hour later.
- The judge repeatedly stated a policy to punish perceived prosecutorial delay, refused to hear explanations, and instructed defense counsel/ERU how to present cases to obtain releases.
- In State v. Dixon the prosecutor, unprepared to file charges on the 21st day, moved to disqualify the judge, attaching transcripts from Matienzo and an affidavit; the trial court denied disqualification.
- The Third District concluded the motion to disqualify was legally sufficient because a reasonably prudent person would fear lack of impartiality given the judge’s announced policy, comments, and interventions; court granted prohibition in Dixon and certiorari relief in Matienzo (remanding for reassignment).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a judge’s announced policy to release defendants if charges are not filed by day 21 warrants disqualification | Policy and statements demonstrate bias and a fixed predisposition making a fair hearing unlikely | Judge’s actions were within discretion to enforce prompt filing and protect liberty | Motion to disqualify was legally sufficient; judge should have been disqualified (Dixon) |
| Whether sua sponte bond reductions without notice or consideration of statutory factors violate law | Sua sponte $1 bonds/ROR on day 21 bypass statutory rules and bail factors, violating rules/statutes | Judge acted to prevent unlawful pretrial incarceration from prosecutorial delay | Trial judge’s practice conflicted with rules 3.134, 3.131 and statutes; order denying pretrial detention quashed (Matienzo) |
| Whether a judge giving tactical suggestions to defense counsel requires disqualification | Directing defense counsel/ERU and suggesting procedures abandons neutrality | Such comments were administrative or aimed at efficient case flow, not bias | Advising defense counsel was improper and supported disqualification principles |
| Whether hostile comments toward the State demonstrate bias requiring disqualification | Accusatory language and refusal to hear explanations show hostility and partiality | Comments reflect legitimate frustration with prosecutorial delays, not personal bias | Hostile comments contributed to legally sufficient fear of unfairness; disqualification required |
Key Cases Cited
- Livingston v. State, 441 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 1983) (legal sufficiency of disqualification depends on whether a reasonably prudent person would fear unfairness)
- Thompson v. State, 990 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 2008) (judicial comments that determine a ruling prior to hearing can require disqualification)
- Gonzalez v. Goldstein, 633 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (judge's announced intention to rule a certain way is paradigmatic bias)
- Great Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. 2000 Island Boulevard Condo. Ass’n, 153 So. 3d 384 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (judge offering legal advice or strategy supports disqualification)
- State v. Borrego, 105 So. 3d 616 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (post‑disqualification rulings entered without authority may be vacated)