State v. Dixon, 254 So. 3d 828

Roy Dixon, charged with production of child pornography (count 1) and two counts of sexual battery of a child under 13 (counts 2–3); convicted by jury and sentenced to concurrent terms (20 years on count 1; 99 years on counts 2 and 3).
Police obtained Dixon’s cell phone after a third party found videos showing a toddler’s genital area being touched and ejaculated on; officers recovered three videos and multiple photos; Dixon gave a recorded statement admitting he made and sent videos/photos to an online correspondent in exchange for images.
Defendant moved for a competency evaluation; counsel participated in the competency hearing by telephone; the trial court found Dixon competent.
On appeal Dixon raised (1) ineffective assistance for counsel’s telephonic participation at the competency hearing, and (2) that his sentences were constitutionally excessive; the court also reviewed the legality of the 20-year sentence for count one.
The court affirmed the convictions, vacated the sentences (counts 1–3), and remanded for resentencing and correction of clerical errors in the commitment/UCO.

Issue	State's Argument	Dixon's Argument	Held
Whether counsel’s telephonic participation at competency hearing denied effective assistance / deprived Dixon of counsel	Telephone participation does not equate to complete denial of counsel; Strickland governs	Telephonic participation prevented meaningful interaction; prejudice presumed under Cronic	Strickland applies (Wright v. Van Patten); counsel’s performance not shown deficient or prejudicial; no relief granted
Whether 99-year sentences on sexual battery counts are constitutionally excessive	Sentence within statutory range; trial court considered aggravating factors	99 years excessive for a first-time offender; facts not worst-in-class	Vacated: 99-year sentences for counts 2 & 3 are grossly disproportionate under the record; remanded for resentencing
Whether denial of motion to reconsider sentence was improper / affects review scope	Motion failed to state specific grounds; limits review to constitutional excessiveness	Argued sentence excessive	Court limited review to constitutional excessiveness (per procedure) and proceeded to vacate sentences on that basis
Whether 20-year sentence for production of child pornography (count 1) was legal	Statute required 25–99 years for production involving victim under 13; State may correct illegal sentence on appeal	(No effective defense argument recorded)	20-year sentence is illegally lenient (below statutory minimum); vacated and remanded for resentencing to statutory range

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two‑part ineffective assistance standard)
Cronic v. United States, 466 U.S. 648 (presumed prejudice only when counsel completely denied at critical stage)
Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120 (attorney’s telephone participation does not automatically equal complete denial of counsel)
State v. Haider, 772 So.2d 189 (La. App. 3 Cir.) (counsel’s absence at competency hearing found reversible where sanity was central to defense)
State v. Wilmot, 142 So.3d 141 (La. App. 5 Cir.) (affirming maximum sentence where long‑term, heinous abuse shown)
State v. Badeaux, 798 So.2d 234 (La. App. 5 Cir.) (discussion of sentencing for sexual offenses involving minors)
Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (fullest information about defendant’s life is highly relevant to sentencing)