State v. Dixon
146 So. 3d 662
La. Ct. App.2014Background
- Dixon was charged (May 2012) with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (La. R.S. 14:95.1) after officers observed him holding and then discard a loaded .22-caliber firearm behind a vehicle.
- Dixon had a prior conviction for simple burglary (sentenced to probation; probation terminated Feb. 3, 2012). He was not on probation at the time of the 2012 arrest.
- Trial court quashed the bill of information, reasoning that the 2012 amendment to La. Const. art. I, § 11 (making the right to keep and bear arms "fundamental" and subject to strict scrutiny) required strict scrutiny as applied and that under those facts the statute should be quashed.
- The State appealed; the Fourth Circuit stayed the appeal pending Louisiana Supreme Court guidance in State v. Draughter and then lifted the stay after that decision.
- On appeal the Fourth Circuit reviewed the as-applied constitutional challenge under mixed-question standards and applied strict scrutiny (because of the 2012 amendment and Draughter).
- The court reversed the trial court, holding La. R.S. 14:95.1 constitutional as applied to Dixon: the State has a compelling interest in preventing felons from possessing firearms and the statute is narrowly tailored (limited list of felonies, ten-year cutoff, definition of firearm).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether La. R.S. 14:95.1 is unconstitutional as applied to Dixon under the 2012 amendment to La. Const. art. I, § 11 | State: statute survives strict scrutiny as applied; compelling interest in public safety and preventing felons from possessing guns | Dixon: 2012 amendment requires strict scrutiny and, under the facts (nonviolent prior burglary; no probation at time of arrest), the statute is unconstitutional as applied | Reversed trial court: statute is constitutional as applied to Dixon; State meets compelling interest and narrow tailoring |
| Whether Dixon’s nonviolent prior felony places him within the class whose right may be restricted | State: prior felony (simple burglary) shows disregard for law and supports restriction | Dixon: nonviolent nature and completed probation mean restriction is unjustified | Held for State: nonviolent felonies can justify restriction given public-safety interest and statutory limits |
| Whether Dixon’s lack of state supervision (not on probation/parole) distinguishes him from Draughter | State: statute still applies to former felons within statutory parameters | Dixon: Draughter protects only those under supervision; he is outside that rationale | Court: Draughter’s rationale for supervised persons not necessary here; compelling interest exists even for discharged felons within statute’s scope |
| Whether the statute is narrowly tailored to satisfy strict scrutiny | State: statute targets enumerated felonies, defines firearms, and includes a ten-year limitation; thus narrowly tailored | Dixon: statute overbroad as applied to him | Court: statute is narrowly tailored and is the least restrictive means to protect public safety |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Draughter, 130 So.3d 855 (La. 2013) (held Washington-style strict scrutiny applies and sustained La. R.S. 14:95.1 as applied to a probationer)
- State v. Amos, 343 So.2d 166 (La. 1977) (upheld felon-in-possession statute under prior, more deferential review)
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognized individual right to possess firearms for self-defense)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (held Second Amendment incorporated against the states)
- State in Interest of J.M., 144 So.3d 853 (La. 2014) (applied strict scrutiny to firearms restrictions and recognized limits do not invalidate all regulations)
- State v. Webb, 144 So.3d 971 (La. 2014) (held La. R.S. 14:95(E) survived strict scrutiny where firearm possession occurred with illegal drugs)
- In re Warner, 21 So.3d 218 (La. 2009) (described strict scrutiny framework applied to fundamental rights)