State v. Dinkins, 2010 WI App 163

Dinkins was convicted in 1999 of first‑degree sexual assault of a child and required to register as a sex offender, including the address where he would be residing.
He was to be released on July 20, 2008, and had to provide the residence information no later than 10 days before release under § 301.45(2)(e)4.
Dinkins did not know his post‑release address; he attempted to locate housing and planned to live with his daughter but could not obtain her address or housing details.
A prosecutor warned of potential charges; social workers and parole agents pressed him to provide an address, even if speculative.
The trial court convicted him after a bench trial; the court withheld sentence and placed him on probation after 90 days of jail, and Dinkins sought postconviction relief.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Meaning of 'residing' in 301.45(2)(a)5	Dinkins argues he cannot be convicted because there was no place where he could 'reside'.	State contends any place one may sleep (e.g., park bench) qualifies as an 'address'.	Park bench not an 'address'; residing requires an extended, livable location.
Pre-release reporting when no stable residence	Without a predictable residence, he cannot provide the required address.	Statute requires reporting of the address where one will reside, regardless of homelessness.	Cannot convict when no address can reasonably be predicted; legislative fix suggested.

State v. Bollig, 232 Wis.2d 561 (2000) (remedial nature of sex offender registry purposes)
Kalal v. State, 271 Wis.2d 633 (2004) (plain-meaning interpretation and statutory context)
State v. Perry, 215 Wis.2d 696 (Ct. App. 1997) (statutory interpretation where facts undisputed)
Schulpius v. State, 298 Wis.2d 155 (Ct. App. 2006) (interpretation of statute where applicable)
Pickett, 975 P.2d 584 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (residence connotes permanence; homelessness not residence)
Twine v. State, 910 A.2d 1132 (Md. 2006) (homelessness precludes 'residence' under reporting)