State v. DICKSEN, 152 Idaho 70

Dicksen pled guilty to an amended felony injury to a child; district court imposed a unified 3-year sentence with 1 year determinate and retained jurisdiction for 180 days.
Near the end of the retained jurisdiction, NICI recommended relinquishment; the district court declined to relinquish, but ordered probation for 26 hours and then immediately a second rider.
The written order described probation for 26 hours with a condition to obtain a probation recommendation by a set time; the court found a violation for not obtaining the recommendation and revoked probation.
The court then retained jurisdiction a second time and sent Dicksen on a second rider; the State appealed challenging the legality of the second rider under I.C. § 19-2601(4).
The State argued the court used a sham probation to circumvent the 180-day retained jurisdiction limit and impose a second rider without an intervening probation.
The appellate court held that the 26-hour order was not a legitimate probation, the second rider was unauthorized, and the later probation order was void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
May a district court order a second rider after retained jurisdiction without a valid intervening probation?	State: requires intervening probation before a second retained jurisdiction.	Dicksen: the issue was procedural; whether jurisdiction was proper.	Yes; second rider invalid for lack of intervening probation.
Did the 26-hour probation constitute a legitimate, enforceable probation with reasonable terms?	State: probation terms were not genuine and not adequately related to rehabilitation.	Dicksen: court attempted to craft a probation; terms were unclear and effectively impossible.	No; probation terms were not legitimate or reasonably related to rehabilitation.
Was the subsequent probation-violation fact-finding necessary before revoking probation and implementing a second rider?	State: probation violations require a hearing and a formal finding.	Dicksen: not expressly argued; procedural due process concerns apply.	Yes; due process requires a hearing and a finding before revoking probation.

State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158 (2010) ((plain language requires an intervening probation before a second retained jurisdiction; discusses limits of 180-day period and 30-day extension))
State v. Gill, 150 Idaho 183 (Ct.App.2010) (second retained jurisdiction requires intervening probation)
State v. Wakefield, 145 Idaho 270 (Ct.App.2007) (validity of probation terms and related due process considerations)
State v. Sandoval, 92 Idaho 853 (1969) (probation conditions must be reasonable and related to rehabilitation)
State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762 (2007) (due process protections before probation revocation; liberty interest)
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (probation revocation requires due process protections)