State v. Dickey
716 S.E.2d 97
S.C.2011Background
- Petitioner Jason Dickey was a security guard at Cornell Arms with a valid concealed weapons permit and carried a loaded pistol.
- On April 29, 2004, Boot and Stroud, who were intoxicated, were at Cornell Arms with McGarrigle and West after a day of drinking; Boot created a disturbance prompting eviction requests.
- Dickey, at the request of a tenant, attempted to eject Boot and Stroud; outside the building, Boot and Stroud advanced toward Dickey while Boot shouted and showed aggression.
- Dickey pulled a gun from his pocket about fifteen feet from Boot and Stroud when they began advancing toward him; Boot continued toward him, and Dickey fired three shots, killing Boot.
- Dickey claimed self-defense; the State indicted him for murder; after trial, he was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, and then the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review self-defense.
- The Supreme Court reversed, holding Dickey was entitled to a directed verdict on self-defense, and did not reach other issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Dickey was entitled to a directed verdict on self-defense | State: self-defense failed to negate elements beyond reasonable doubt | Dickey: acted in self-defense; no fault in ejecting trespassers; imminent danger | Yes; directed verdict for Dickey on self-defense affirmed |
| Whether the Stand Your Ground law applied retroactively to Dickey | State: Act applies prospectively; no retroactive immunity | Dickey: Act should apply retroactively to pending cases | Applied prospectively; Act not retroactively applied |
| Whether self-defense jury instructions were adequate | State: instructions correctly stated elements and right to act on appearances | Dickey: curtilage/duty to retreat and other nuances were inadequately charged | Instructions sufficiently covered self-defense elements; no reversible error |
| Whether the voluntary manslaughter instruction was properly submitted | State: fear can support heat of passion under voluntary manslaughter | Dickey: fear not sufficiently shown to warrant heat of passion; improper subtraction from murder | Court of Appeals' submission affirmed; district disagreed in plurality; but Court reversed on self-defense, rendering this issue moot for the final disposition |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Davis, 282 S.C. 45, 317 S.E.2d 452 (1984) (defines four elements of self-defense)
- State v. Hendrix, 270 S.C. 653, 244 S.E.2d 503 (1978) (castle doctrine and retreat considerations)
- State v. Starnes, 388 S.C. 590, 698 S.E.2d 604 (2010) (limits on heat-of-passion instruction after fear evidence)
- State v. Fuller, 297 S.C. 440, 377 S.E.2d 328 (1989) (appearance of imminent danger and self-defense standard)
- State v. Wiggins, 330 S.C. 538, 500 S.E.2d 489 (1998) (curtilage and duty to retreat concepts)
- State v. Jackson, 297 S.C. 523, 377 S.E.2d 570 (1989) (test for acting on appearances in self-defense)
- State v. Brooks, 252 S.C. 504, 167 S.E.2d 307 (1969) (right to eject from premises and related retreat implications)
- State v. Taylor, 356 S.C. 227, 589 S.E.2d 1 (2003) (mutual combat doctrine considerations)
- State v. Burkhart, 350 S.C. 252, 565 S.E.2d 298 (2002) (directed verdict standard for self-defense challenges)
