State v. Dickerson
345 P.3d 447
| Or. | 2015Background
- Defendant and his son, after legal hunting hours, stopped near two state trooper-placed deer decoys; the son fired two shots using defendant’s rifles, damaging the decoys.
- Troopers observed, stopped them, and the son admitted shooting; defendant admitted rifle ownership.
- Defendant was charged with, among other counts, second-degree criminal mischief under ORS 164.354 for intentionally damaging “property of another.”
- At trial the state’s theory was that defendant aided and abetted his son in shooting what they believed were live deer; the information was amended to charge damage to property of the State of Oregon.
- Defendant moved for judgment of acquittal arguing wild deer are not “property of another” until reduced to possession; the trial court denied the motion, jury convicted, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
- The Supreme Court granted review to decide whether wild deer qualify as “property of another” under ORS 164.305(2)/164.354(1)(b).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether wild deer are “property of another” under ORS 164.305(2) for criminal mischief | State: wildlife is statutory property of the state; the state’s sovereign/trust interest is a legal interest within the statute | Dickerson: sovereign/regulatory interest is not a proprietary legal or equitable interest; animals aren’t property until captured | Held: Wild deer are “property of another”; the state’s sovereign/trust interest is a legal interest under the statute |
| Whether appellate court may affirm on alternate theories (wrong reason) | State: conviction can be affirmed because juror could find intent to shoot decoys or to shoot deer not belonging to defendant | Dickerson: trial theory was shooting live deer; new theories weren’t supported by trial record | Held: Court declined to affirm on alternate theories because they were inconsistent with trial theory or unsupported by the record |
| Whether the 1977 expansion of “property of another” was meant to be limited (e.g., security interests only) | State: amendment broadened the term to cover legal/equitable interests generally | Dickerson: amendment intended only to capture certain interests (e.g., security interests) | Held: The amendment is broad; no textual basis to read in a narrow limitation |
| Whether criminal mischief requires proof that the State “owned” the damaged property | State: ownership by state not required so long as property is “property of another” | Dickerson: questioned applicability where sovereign interest is regulatory | Held: It is sufficient that the damaged thing is “property of another”; state ownership need not be separately proven |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160 (interpreting statutory text, context, and legislative history)
- Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc. v. State of Oregon, 331 Or 634 (appellate discretion to affirm on alternate grounds)
- State v. Hume, 52 Or 1 (adopting common-law view that title in wild animals is held by the state in trust)
- Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (describing state ownership of wildlife as a legal fiction/trust rationale)
- Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (classic articulation of the wildlife trust doctrine)