258 So. 3d 230
La. Ct. App.2018Background
- Defendant John Paul Devillier shot at Corporal Burt Hazeltine during a school‑zone traffic detail on April 16, 2015; Hazeltine was wounded (arm, chest, left eye) and lost vision in one eye. Defendant fired multiple rounds from a 9mm Glock and a .357 revolver; casings/projectiles recovered corroborated extensive shooting.
- Defendant initially approached Hazeltine angry, left, called sheriff staff, returned with firearms visible on the dashboard, refused orders to drop weapons, and engaged in a gunfight; deputies tased and arrested him after he tossed weapons.
- Charged with attempted first‑degree murder of a peace officer (La. R.S. 14:27, 14:30). Trial jury convicted; sentence 40 years hard labor without benefits.
- Defendant pursued a dual plea (not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity). Defense presented three experts who opined insanity/substance‑induced psychosis; State presented a rebuttal expert (Dr. Thompson) who found defendant sane. Jury rejected insanity defense.
- On appeal defendant raised sufficiency of the evidence (lack of specific intent; self‑defense; insanity), erroneous jury instructions (inferred intent; attempt language), improper admission of La. C.E. art. 404(B) other‑acts testimony, and excessiveness of sentence. Court affirmed conviction and sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency — specific intent for attempted 1st‑degree murder | Evidence showed defendant pointed and fired weapons repeatedly at an on‑duty peace officer; intent may be inferred from use of deadly weapon and extent of injuries. | No rational juror could find specific intent to kill; at most attempted manslaughter or aggravated battery; acted under provocation/self‑defense. | Affirmed: viewing evidence in light most favorable to prosecution, a rational juror could infer specific intent from shooting, continued firing after victim fell, and physical/forensic evidence. |
| Self‑defense burden/evidence | State: defendant failed to prove self‑defense by preponderance; eyewitness and forensic evidence rebut self‑defense. | Devillier: officer drew first, so defendant reasonably defended himself; not aggressor. | Affirmed: jury rejected self‑defense; defendant escalated and returned armed; evidence did not show reasonable belief of imminent deadly harm or good‑faith withdrawal. |
| Insanity defense (burden: preponderance) | State: expert testimony and defendant's conduct before/after shooting supported sanity; rebuttal expert undermined delusional disorder diagnosis. | Defendant: three experts opined psychosis/delusional disorder (medication, sleep deprivation) preventing appreciation of right/wrong. | Affirmed: jury credited State expert and likely reasonable in finding defendant failed to prove inability to distinguish right from wrong. |
| Jury instructions — inferred intent and attempt language | State: instruction tracked statutory/precedent language on intent and attempt; lawful. | Devillier: instruction impermissibly created a presumption shifting burden (Sandstrom concern) and attempt language ("lying in wait") could mislead jury. | Affirmed: court found instruction permissive ("may infer") and consistent with precedent; attempt language mirrored statute and was not unduly emphasized. |
| Admission of other‑acts (La. C.E. art. 404(B)) — Gulfport incidents | State: prior incidents showing refusal to obey officers and nearby loaded firearms were admissible to prove intent, plan, knowledge, absence of mistake, and rebut self‑defense. | Devillier: prior acts were remote/dissimilar and more prejudicial than probative. | Affirmed: trial court did not abuse discretion — prior acts sufficiently similar, relevant to contested intent, limiting instructions given, and any error harmless. |
| Excessive sentence | State: 40 years within statutory range and supported by gravity (attempt on peace officer, permanent injury, public danger). | Devillier: age, first‑felony offender, mental history, provocation mitigate; term effectively life sentence. | Affirmed: sentence not grossly disproportionate; judge considered PSI and mitigation; comparable precedents support upper‑range sentence. |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (jury instructions that create impermissible burden‑shifting presumption)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (two‑pronged test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- State v. Taylor, 217 So.3d 283 (La. 2016) (procedure and standard for admitting other‑acts evidence under La. C.E. art. 404(B))
- State v. Copeland, 530 So.2d 526 (La. 1988) (permissive inference language on intent in jury charges)
- State v. Mitchell, 674 So.2d 250 (La. 1996) (approval of certain intent instruction language)