State v. DeSantis
N17A-02-007 ALR
| Del. Super. Ct. | Oct 17, 2017Background
- Mark DeSantis, a DelDOT construction manager, regularly inspected nighttime roadway projects and sometimes worked overtime; he had an office in Bear, DE.
- DeSantis was not paid for commuting time or mileage between home and work and was not permitted to take a State vehicle home.
- On Oct. 16–17, 2014, after attending a professional association event he was not required to attend, DeSantis visited a Kirkwood Highway worksite late at night, left ~11:30–11:45 PM, and was injured in a car accident at 12:03 AM while driving home.
- DeSantis filed for workers’ compensation; the Industrial Accident Board awarded benefits, finding the injury arose out of and in the course of employment via the “semi-fixed place of employment” exception and, alternatively, because the travel was “unusual, urgent, or risky.”
- The State appealed; the Superior Court reviewed de novo legal questions and for substantial evidence as to factual findings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether injury arose out of and in the course of employment under Spellman contractual-first framework | DeSantis argued his late-site visit and resulting commute were work-related and compensable (semi-fixed place / exceptions) | State argued employment contract excluded compensation for commuting time, so injury not compensable | Court held Spellman requires first looking to the employment contract; because DeSantis was not compensated for commuting, inquiry should have ended for noncompensability |
| Whether Board properly applied the “semi-fixed place of employment” exception | DeSantis argued exception applied to his on-site presence and commute | State argued Board erred to invoke exceptions where contract terms resolved the issue | Court held Board erred to apply the exception as part of the contractual analysis when contract evidence was sufficient |
| Whether Board permissibly relied on “unusual, urgent, or risky” travel analysis | DeSantis (and Board) relied on this alternative to justify compensability | State argued Spellman does not authorize that analysis once contract resolves issue | Court held applying an “unusual, urgent, or risky” test was legal error under Spellman |
| Remedy: remand or affirm | DeSantis sought affirmation of award | State sought reversal | Court reversed Board decision and remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion |
Key Cases Cited
- Spellman v. Christiana Care Health Servs., 74 A.3d 619 (Del. 2013) (establishes contractual-first framework for determining whether travel is work-related)
- Histed v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 621 A.2d 340 (Del. 1993) (articulates the going-and-coming rule)
- Glanden v. Land Prep, Inc., 918 A.2d 1098 (Del. 2007) (standard of review on appeal from Industrial Accident Board)
- Future Ford Sales, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 654 A.2d 837 (Del. 1995) (remand principles and agency review standards)
