State v. Derrick R. Oliver, 68 A.3d 549

Defendant Derrick R. Oliver faced two consolidated Rhode Island matters arising from separate incidents (Sept. 2004 motor-vehicle assault; Apr. 2005 parking-lot stabbing/theft). He was incarcerated in Massachusetts at relevant times.
Rhode Island lodged a detainer (Jan. 13, 2006) and the state received a request for final disposition; the trial court found the State received notice by April 17, 2006. The IADA 180‑day period would thus have expired Oct. 13, 2006.
Multiple continuances followed; nine continuances occurred between April 17 and Oct. 13, 2006, six attributable to defendant (including defense requests and counsel being excused) and three requested by the State to which defendant did not object.
Defendant moved to dismiss under the IADA for failure to bring him to trial within 180 days; the trial court denied the motion, and later denied reconsideration, concluding defendant had sought or acquiesced to many of the continuances and therefore could not claim dismissal.
At a bench trial in March 2009, defendant was convicted of various counts: domestic assault with a dangerous weapon and assault with a dangerous weapon (from the motor-vehicle incident); and assault with a dangerous weapon, larceny, and violating a no-contact order (from the parking-lot incident). Sentences were imposed and defendant appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether charges must be dismissed under the IADA because trial did not begin within 180 days after defendant's request for disposition	State: IADA dismissal not required where many continuances were attributable to defendant and defendant never timely objected to State continuances	Oliver: Trial began well after 180 days following the State's receipt of his IADA request, so dismissal is mandatory under the statute	Court: Affirmed denial of dismissal — delays caused by defendant (and his acquiescence to State requests) and failure to timely object forfeited the IADA claim
Whether convictions for assault with a dangerous weapon and larceny violate Double Jeopardy	State: Assault and larceny were based on distinct acts (assault motivated by rage; larceny a subsequent taking) so separate convictions are permissible	Oliver: Conviction of assault duplicates a robbery-based assault (original indictment charged robbery) and thus punished the same conduct as the theft conviction	Court: No double jeopardy violation — robbery charge was not convicted; larceny (theft) and assault involved distinct acts/elements, so multiple convictions allowed

State v. Clifton, 777 A.2d 1272 (R.I. 2001) (IADA reviewed de novo; give deference to factual findings)
State v. Werner, 831 A.2d 183 (R.I. 2003) (IADA purpose and construction)
State v. Shatney, 572 A.2d 872 (R.I. 1990) (IADA does not protect against delays caused by defendant)
New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110 (2000) (good-cause extension under IADA is sole means for prosecution to extend time over defendant's objection)
Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994) (defendant who obscures IADA deadline and delays objection forfeits relief)
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (same-evidence test for double jeopardy)