State v. Deng, 1 CA-CR 15-0638

Victim (Deng’s step-daughter, then 16) made multiple recorded phone calls to Deng confronting him about past sexual conduct; Deng admitted to multiple sexual acts during the calls.
Police arranged/encouraged the confrontation call and the victim recorded it with her consent; Deng was at work during the calls and twice could have, and did, end conversations.
Deng moved to suppress the recorded call arguing it was involuntary, the victim acted as a state agent, and the call violated his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth Amendment rights and A.R.S. § 13-3988; the trial court denied suppression after listening to the recording.
At jury selection four potential jurors who could not understand English were excused after both parties declined to object; Deng did not challenge the factual basis for excusal.
Jury convicted Deng on ten counts of sexual conduct with a minor and one count of sexual abuse; court imposed consecutive prison terms; Deng appealed arguing suppression and juror-exclusion errors.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Deng)	Held
Voluntariness / State-agent	Statements were voluntarily obtained and admissible; statutory one-party consent and totality of circumstances support admissibility	Victim acted at police behest as a state agent and used psychological pressure to overbear his will, rendering statements involuntary under A.R.S. §13-3988	Denied: Court found statements voluntary under totality of circumstances; any victim "trickery" did not amount to coercive police behavior.
Fourth Amendment privacy	One-party consent to recording is lawful; confrontation calls do not violate Fourth Amendment	Deng had heightened privacy expectation (in loco parentis; took steps to protect privacy) making interception unlawful	Denied: Court held no Fourth Amendment violation; monitoring with one-party consent is permitted.
Fifth / Sixth Amendment / Miranda	N/A (State)	Victim-as-state-agent meant Deng should have Miranda warnings and Sixth Amendment right to counsel as the accused	Denied: Miranda not required because Deng was not in custody; Sixth Amendment had not attached pre-indictment.
Excusal of non-English jurors	Excusal lawful under statute; parties waived objection	Trial court erred by excusing jurors without determining actual English comprehension	Denied: No reversible error — statute permits excusal for inability to understand English, parties did not object, and Deng did not contest facts.

State v. Allgood, 171 Ariz. 522 (App. 1992) (one-party consent confrontation call lawful and admissible)
State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116 (2006) (statutory requirement that a statement be voluntary to be admissible)
State v. Boggs, 218 Ariz. 325 (2008) (two-part voluntariness test: coercive police behavior and causal relation to overborne will)
State v. Lopez, 174 Ariz. 131 (1992) (totality of circumstances governs voluntariness inquiry)
State v. Keller, 114 Ariz. 572 (1977) (victim’s demands may not constitute coercion rendering statements involuntary)
State v. Stanley, 123 Ariz. 95 (App. 1979) (no Fourth Amendment invasion where one party consents to monitoring/recording)