State v. Delong, 275 Or. App. 295

Deputy Robeson stopped Delong for a seatbelt violation, removed, frisked, handcuffed him, and placed him in the patrol car; Robeson did not give Miranda warnings before questioning.
Robeson asked whether there was “anything in the vehicle that we should be concerned about”; Delong replied no and said the deputies could search the car (Delong also said much of his stuff was in the trunk).
Deputy Poe searched the car, found a zipped fanny pack under the passenger seat, opened it, and discovered methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.
After the search, Poe read Miranda warnings, and Delong made incriminating statements admitting ownership of the fanny pack and the drugs.
On remand from the Oregon Supreme Court, the court was directed to decide (1) whether the search of the fanny pack exceeded the scope of Delong’s consent, and (2) whether Delong’s post-Miranda statements were admissible given the unlawful search.
The court held the search exceeded the scope of consent (so the physical evidence must be suppressed) and that Delong’s post-Miranda statements were inadmissible because the Miranda warnings did not sufficiently attenuate the taint of the unlawful search.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Delong)	Held
Scope of consent to search the car — did consent extend to closed containers (the fanny pack)?	State: Delong’s offer that deputies could “search the vehicle” authorized searching closed containers found in the car.	Delong: His consent was limited to searching the vehicle generally (e.g., trunk/personal property); a reasonable person would not expect deputies to open zipped personal containers.	Held: Search exceeded scope; general/vague consent did not reasonably authorize opening the zipped fanny pack; physical evidence suppressed.
Admissibility of post-Miranda statements — did belated Miranda warnings cure the prior constitutional violation so statements are admissible?	State: (Had primarily argued search was within consent; if lawful, post-Miranda statements would be admissible.)	Delong: Post-Miranda statements were the fruit of the unlawful search; warnings did not break the causal chain—statements must be excluded.	Held: Post-Miranda statements inadmissible; under totality/exploitation analysis (including Unger/Ayles factors), Miranda did not attenuate taint because police exploited the unlawful search to obtain statements.

Delong v. State, 260 Or. App. 718 (Or. Ct. App. 2014) (appellate opinion addressing suppression and consent issues)
Delong v. State, 357 Or. 365 (Or. 2015) (Oregon Supreme Court decision reversing and remanding for narrow issues)
State v. Vondehn, 348 Or. 462 (Or. 2009) (multi-factor test for whether belated Miranda warnings effectively cure an Article I, §12 violation)
State v. Ayles, 348 Or. 622 (Or. 2010) (Miranda warnings did not attenuate taint where illegal seizure/search led directly to incriminating evidence and confession)
State v. Unger, 356 Or. 59 (Or. 2014) (refined exploitation analysis for determining whether evidence derived from an unlawful search/seizure must be suppressed)
State v. Jacobsen, 142 Or. App. 341 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (general consent to search vehicle did not include a zipped duffel bag absent circumstances indicating officers were looking for items concealable in containers)
State v. Lamoreux, 271 Or. App. 757 (Or. Ct. App. 2015) (scope-of-consent assessed by what a reasonable person would understand given surrounding circumstances)
State v. Charlesworth/Parks, 151 Or. App. 100 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (context can make a general consent encompass closed containers when objective circumstances indicate officers sought contraband stored in such containers)