State v. Delbosque, 456 P.3d 806

In 1993, 17-year-old Cristian J. Delbosque murdered two people; he was convicted of aggravated first-degree murder and originally sentenced to mandatory life without parole (LWOP).
Washington's "Miller-fix" statutes (RCW 10.95.030/10.95.035) required resentencing of juvenile LWOP prisoners after Miller v. Alabama.
In 2016 Delbosque was resentenced after a four-day Miller-fix hearing; the trial court imposed a minimum term of 48 years and found Delbosque permanently incorrigible and exhibiting an ongoing predatory attitude.
At resentencing the defense presented extensive mitigation (childhood trauma, alcohol-induced psychosis at the time of the offense, expert testimony showing diminished culpability and low present dangerousness); the State relied on the crime, Delbosque’s trial attempt to blame his girlfriend, and prison infractions (including a 2010 infraction).
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the trial court’s findings lacked substantial evidence and treating the appeal as a personal restraint petition (PRP); it remanded for resentencing.
The Washington Supreme Court affirmed that the findings were not supported by substantial evidence and remanded for resentencing, but reversed the Court of Appeals on procedure: Miller-fix resentencings generate a new, appealable sentence and RCW 10.95.035(3) cannot limit review to PRPs.

Issue	Delbosque's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether the superior court's findings (ongoing predatory attitude; irreparable corruption/permanent incorrigibility) were supported by substantial evidence	Insufficient current evidence of incorrigibility; mitigation and post‑offense conduct show capacity for change	Crime severity, trial conduct (blaming girlfriend), and prison infractions supported findings	Findings not supported by substantial evidence; trial court abused discretion; sentence reversed and remanded
Whether remand for resentencing is the appropriate remedy and whether the resentencing court should have the benefit of later Washington precedents (e.g., Ramos, Bassett)	Remand appropriate so the trial court may apply Ramos/Bassett and properly consider youth mitigation	Argued Court of Appeals misallocated burdens and other procedural objections	Remand for resentencing affirmed so the trial court can apply subsequent controlling precedent; statute does not allocate a burden of proof
Whether RCW 10.95.035(3) (review "to the same extent as" pre‑1986 parole board minimum‑term review) violates article I, §22 (right to appeal)	Limiting review to PRP violates constitutional right to appeal from a new resentencing	Analogized Miller‑fix minimum terms to parole‑board minimum‑term review and argued PRP is appropriate	RCW 10.95.035(3) violates article I, §22; Miller‑fix resentencings result in a new, appealable sentence (direct appeal available)

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory LWOP for juveniles unconstitutional; courts must account for youth differences)
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (youth traits make death penalty less justifiable; character less formed)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (juveniles less deserving of the most severe punishments)
State v. Ramos, 187 Wn.2d 420 (2017) (Miller hearings must meaningfully consider how juveniles differ and receive and assess mitigation evidence)
State v. Bassett, 192 Wn.2d 67 (2018) (categorical constraints on juvenile LWOP; irreparable corruption determinations should be rare)
In re Pers. Restraint of McNeil, 181 Wn.2d 582 (2014) (explaining Miller‑fix remedy requires resentencing consistent with Miller)
United States v. Briones, 929 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2019) (Miller resentencing must focus forward on capacity for change, not backward on the crime)