State v. DeFranco
426 N.J. Super. 240
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.2012Background
- Superseding indictment charged DeFranco with first-degree aggravated sexual assault, second-degree sexual assault, and third-degree endangering the welfare of a child.
- Defendant moved to suppress a secretly recorded telephone conversation obtained with the victim’s consent; the call was intercepted with the victim and detective Potter present.
- Police used the victim’s information, including a cell phone number supplied by the school via a School Resource Officer, to obtain the number used to place the call.
- SRO Tucker, assigned to the school, obtained the number from the principal’s secretary and included it in the school’s documentation; the MOA authorized his role in protecting students.
- Defendant pled guilty to second-degree sexual assault in 2010, based on a factual basis involving events when the victim was thirteen; he was sentenced to five years with Megan’s Law requirements.
- On appeal, DeFranco argued the suppression ruling and privacy protections under Article I, Paragraph 7 were broader than Fourth Amendment protections; the Appellate Division affirmed the denial of suppression, and the matter proceeded through appellate review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DeFranco had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell phone number. | State: no protected privacy interest; number disclosed to school and police not private. | DeFranco had privacy in his number; disclosure to few does not waive it. | No reasonable expectation of privacy; or alternatively, privacy waived; court affirmed denial of suppression. |
| Whether disclosure of the cell phone number was properly obtained without a warrant or subpoena. | State acted within authority as SRO could access number. | Requires search warrant or subpoena; no waiver or lawful access absent court process. | No error in denying suppression; number obtainable by school personnel under MOA. |
| Whether the doctrine of inevitable discovery cured the lack of court process. | State could rely on inevitable discovery to avoid suppression. | Inevitable discovery does not justify unlawful acquisition. | Not necessary to decide; no reversible error given waiver and agency role. |
| Whether school officials unlawfully provided the number to police. | Officials acted within MOA and safety duties. | Information-sharing violated privacy expectations. | No unlawful conduct by school officials found; proper under MOA. |
| Whether admission of the intercepted recording amounted to reversible error given the disputed acquisition. | Recording was central to the case against DeFranco. | Illegality of obtaining number taints the recording. | Harmful error not shown; recording properly admitted under circumstances. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Reid, 194 N.J. 386 (N.J. 2008) (privacy in IP addresses; informational privacy discussed; not adopted here)
- State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338 (N.J. 1982) (telephone-number privacy and privacy interests)
- State v. Hempele, 120 N.J. 182 (N.J. 1990) (privacy in garbage held in closed container)
- State v. McAllister, 184 N.J. 17 (N.J. 2005) (privacy in bank records)
- State v. Domicz, 188 N.J. 285 (N.J. 2006) (need for subpoena for utility records)
- State v. Maristany, 133 N.J. 299 (N.J. 1993) (police access via MOA; role of SRO in gathering information)
- State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210 (N.J. 1983) (police investigative procedures and privacy)
- Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 129 N.J. 81 (N.J. 1992) (privacy considerations in intrusion)
