129 So. 3d 1089
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2013Background
- In 2011 Gary G. Debaun, who knew he was HIV-positive, engaged in mutual fellatio and penile-anal intercourse with C.M., who had requested an HIV test report before their relationship.
- Debaun provided a report indicating he was HIV-negative; C.M. later learned Debaun was HIV-positive and charges were brought under section 384.24(2), which criminalizes having "sexual intercourse" while knowing one has HIV unless the partner is informed and consents.
- Debaun moved to dismiss, arguing "sexual intercourse" in § 384.24(2) means only penis–vagina penetration; the trial court dismissed based on the Second District's decision in L.A.P. v. State.
- The Third District reviewed statutory construction de novo and examined dictionary definitions, Chapter 384’s purpose, legislative history, and prior case law to determine the meaning of "sexual intercourse."
- The majority concluded the plain and ordinary meaning of "sexual intercourse" (as of the statute’s 1986 enactment) includes genital contact beyond penis–vagina penetration, thus covering fellatio and penile-anal intercourse; it reversed dismissal and remanded to reinstate charges.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning/scope of "sexual intercourse" in § 384.24(2) | The State: term includes sexual acts beyond heterosexual vaginal penetration (e.g., oral and anal contact) because statute's purpose is to prevent spread of STDs and dictionary definition is broad. | Debaun: term limited to penis–vagina penetration; prior cases (e.g., L.A.P.) support narrow definition. | The court held the term includes oral and anal acts (more than penis–vagina penetration) and thus covers the conduct charged. |
| Reliance on prior statutes/case law vs. plain language/dictionary | The State: plain meaning and context of Chapter 384 control; legislative substitution of gender-neutral language and expansion of covered diseases supports broader scope. | Debaun: longstanding case law and historical usage define "sexual intercourse" narrowly; courts should not judicially expand statutory crimes—legislature should amend if intended. | The court favored plain language and dictionary meaning in context of the statute's purpose, rejecting narrow case-law-based definitional limits. |
Key Cases Cited
- Paul v. State, 112 So.3d 1188 (Fla. 2013) (plain and ordinary statutory meaning controls interpretation)
- L.A.P. v. State, 62 So.3d 693 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (held "sexual intercourse" limited to penis–vagina penetration for § 384.24(2))
- Lanier v. State, 443 So.2d 178 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (defined "sexual intercourse" as contact/penetration of sexual organs)
- Williams v. State, 109 So. 305 (Fla. 1926) ("sexual intercourse" as contact of sexual organs and penetration)
- E.A.R. v. State, 4 So.3d 614 (Fla. 2009) (statutory construction directive: legislative intent determined from text)
- State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371 (Fla. 1995) (avoid interpretations that lead to absurd results)
- State v. D.C., 114 So.3d 440 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (similarly concluded § 384.24(2) is not limited to heterosexual vaginal intercourse)