111 A.3d 376
R.I.2015Background
- On Nov. 20–21, 2006 Deaven Tucker and accomplices robbed a Providence bank; less than 12 hours later Tucker lured Jennifer Duarte outside a car in Pawtucket and shot her multiple times, killing her.
- Months earlier in Florida Tucker organized an act that resulted in the killing of Ronald Spearin; Tucker feared witnesses (including Jennifer) would identify participants to Miami-Dade investigators and expose him or his partner Victoria Berardinelli.
- Testimony at trial described Tucker’s statements that Jennifer “had to go,” offers to pay others to kill her, and post-crime actions (hiding the gun, destroying clothing); evidence of the Florida events was admitted under Rule 404(b) as motive/plan.
- Tucker was convicted on all counts after a jury trial (including murder and multiple weapons/robbery counts) and sentenced to three consecutive life terms plus 35 nonparolable years.
- On appeal Tucker challenged: (1) admission of Rule 404(b) evidence (Florida/Spearin events and related investigation); (2) denial of a mistrial after witness Ruiz testified on cross that he and Tucker had committed prior robberies ("good lick" testimony); and (3) alleged prosecutorial improprieties in closing argument.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Tucker) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Florida/Spearin evidence under Rule 404(b) | Evidence was admissible to show motive, intent and plan for killing Jennifer and to provide coherent narrative; limiting instructions would mitigate prejudice | Admission impermissibly presented propensity evidence and was unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 | Court affirmed admission: 404(b) exception (motive/plan) applies; probative value outweighed prejudice; multiple limiting instructions were given |
| Mistrial for "good lick" testimony (witness stated prior robberies with defendant) | Statement was harmless after being stricken; defense counsel had been forewarned and opened door by voir dire; no juror inflation shown | Testimony injected unrelated criminality, potentially inflaming jurors and warranting mistrial | Court denied mistrial: defense counsel’s questioning risked the disclosure; trial justice acted properly (struck statement; no showing of irreversible prejudice) |
| Prosecutorial misconduct in closing (three remarks challenged) | Prosecutor’s comments were fair inferences from evidence (defendant’s coaching of witnesses; testimony about Jennifer’s relationship with her son; discussion of admitted 404(b) evidence) | Comments were inflammatory, suggested defense counsel was defendant’s tool, and introduced improper victim-impact material | Court rejected claims: prosecutor stayed within permissible latitude, relied on trial record and admitted evidence; no reversible error |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Pona, 948 A.2d 941 (R.I. 2008) (limits on quantum of other-crimes evidence and prejudice concerns)
- State v. Pona, 66 A.3d 454 (R.I. 2013) (Rule 403 scrutiny for 404(b) evidence; exclusion only when marginal relevance and enormous prejudice)
- State v. Boillard, 789 A.2d 881 (R.I. 2002) (prosecutor closing-argument latitude; remarks must relate to evidence)
- State v. Horton, 871 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2005) (prosecutor may draw reasonable inferences from admitted evidence)
- State v. LaPlante, 962 A.2d 63 (R.I. 2009) (trial justice’s denial of mistrial reviewed for clear error)