State v. De La O, S-1-SC-40702

After a traffic stop for unilluminated tail lights, Defendant drove away, led police on a high-speed chase, crashed, fled on foot with a sawed-off shotgun, and shot Officer Ferguson, who died. 1
At trial, Defendant did not dispute the basic events and claimed he acted rashly or impulsively rather than with deliberate intent to kill. 2
The jury convicted Defendant of willful and deliberate first-degree murder, found the peace-officer aggravator, and the court imposed life without possibility of release or parole. 3
Defendant appealed, arguing instructional fundamental error, insufficient evidence, improper denial of mistrial, and improper sentence aggravation. 4
The district court used a mixed instruction on the peace-officer aggravator without bifurcating guilt and sentencing proceedings. 5
The Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed all convictions and sentence aggravations in a nonprecedential decision. 6

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did the peace-officer aggravator instruction create fundamental error? 7	State said the instructions correctly separated first-degree murder from the aggravator.	De La O said the instruction suggested a lower mens rea for first-degree murder.	No; any ambiguity was cured by the instruction’s sequencing and context. 8
Was there sufficient evidence of deliberate first-degree murder? 9	State argued the shooting and flight allowed an inference of deliberation.	De La O claimed the evidence showed only a rash, impulsive shooting.	Yes; a rational jury could infer deliberate intent from Defendant’s actions. 10
Was tampering with evidence supported by sufficient evidence? 11	State argued Defendant discarded items to avoid apprehension and prosecution.	De La O said the items were quickly found and not concealed.	Yes; discarding the gun and shirt while fleeing supported tampering. 12
Did the warrant testimony require a mistrial? 13	State said the brief remark was cured by an admonition and was harmless.	De La O said the warrant evidence was inadmissible propensity evidence.	No; the isolated remark was harmless and did not affect the verdict. 14
Were the aggravated sentences improper under Section 31-18-15.1? 15	State said the statute is valid and the aggravating facts were proper.	De La O said the statute is vague and the aggravators were improper.	No; the statute remains valid and the aggravators were permissible. 16

State v. Benally, 131 N.M. 258, 34 P.3d 1134 (N.M. 2001) (fundamental-error review asks whether a reasonable juror was confused or misdirected 17)
State v. Parish, 118 N.M. 39, 878 P.2d 988 (N.M. 1994) (ambiguous instructions must be cured by other instructions 18)
State v. Astorga, 343 P.3d 1245 (N.M. 2015) (manner of killing can alone support deliberation inference 19)
State v. Romero, 435 P.3d 1231 (N.M. 2019) (deliberate intent to kill an officer may be inferred from surrounding conduct 20)
State v. Jackson, 497 P.3d 1208 (N.M. Ct. App. 2021) (no tampering where drugs were tossed in plain view of officers 21)
State v. Radosevich, 419 P.3d 176 (N.M. 2018) (tampering punishes efforts to obstruct access to evidence 22)
State v. Segotta, 672 P.2d 1129 (N.M. 1983) (section 31-18-15.1 is not void for vagueness and allows broad aggravation factors 23)
State v. Roper, 34 P.3d 133 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) (all circumstances of the offense may be considered in aggravation 24)
State v. Chadwick-McNally, 414 P.3d 326 (N.M. 2018) (capital felony sentencing act does not require bifurcated proceedings for LWOP aggravators 25)
State v. Gonzales, 794 P.2d 361 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (nonprecedential decisions are written solely for the parties 26)