State v. Dawson, 340 Conn. 136

On Aug. 10, 2014, Norwalk police patrolling a housing complex entered a courtyard and found six nonresidents gathered near a picnic table; officer Lipeika saw a revolver in plain view in the corner by some bushes.
Seating: Jackson and Kason Sumpter were ~2–3 ft from the gun; Dawson (defendant) sat ~4–5 ft away with his back to a wall; two others were on a nearby bench.
Officers photographed and seized the loaded 2" revolver; no usable latent fingerprints were recovered.
Swabs from the gun/ammunition produced a low‑yield, partially degraded touch‑DNA mixture. Forensic analysis excluded three people at the table but could not exclude Dawson as a contributor; two nearby persons were not DNA‑tested.
At trial the jury convicted Dawson of criminal possession of a pistol or revolver (§53a‑217c) and third‑degree criminal trespass; the Appellate Court affirmed on circumstantial grounds (proximity, inference of someone stashing the gun, and DNA).
The Connecticut Supreme Court granted certification, reversed the possession conviction, and directed acquittal on that charge while affirming other aspects of the judgment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Dawson)	Held
Sufficiency of evidence to prove constructive possession of a firearm	Circumstantial evidence (gun in plain view, appeared recently placed; common officer practice that persons stash guns when police arrive; gun placed accessible to its possessor) plus DNA that did not exclude Dawson supports inference he knew of and intended to control the gun.	Proximity plus trace touch‑DNA that only fails to exclude him is insufficient; no evidence he touched, handled, hid, or attempted to retrieve the gun; DNA cannot show how or when it was deposited.	Reversed: evidence insufficient. Mere proximity and inconclusive touch‑DNA do not prove knowledge and intentional dominion or control beyond a reasonable doubt.
Admissibility/weight of touch‑DNA evidence to establish conduct/possession	DNA that cannot exclude defendant as contributor is a meaningful link when combined with the other circumstantial evidence.	Touch‑DNA is prone to primary/secondary transfer and aerosolization; low quantity, degraded, mixed profile, unknown timing, and untested persons make it inconclusive to prove contact or knowledge.	Held for Dawson: touch‑DNA here was too limited and ambiguous (mixture, degradation, unknown deposition mechanism/timing, not definitive identification) to support constructive possession even with other circumstantial facts.

State v. Rhodes, 335 Conn. 226 (Conn. 2020) (defendant's control/ownership of vehicle and conduct can support constructive possession)
State v. Bowens, 118 Conn. App. 112 (Conn. App. 2009) (flight and connection to vehicle supported inference of knowledge and control)
United States v. Beverly, 750 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1984) (proximity‑only facts—presence near contraband and touch evidence—insufficient for constructive possession)
State v. Winfrey, 302 Conn. 195 (Conn. 2011) (when defendant lacks exclusive possession, additional incriminating circumstances are required to infer knowledge and control)
State v. Martin, 285 Conn. 135 (Conn. 2008) (mere presence, without other incriminating facts, is insufficient to prove dominion or control)