State v. Davis, 808 N.W.2d 130

Davis was convicted of felony murder related to the armed robbery and shooting death of Henry Matthews and sentenced to 80 years with 60 initial and 20 extended supervision.
The State relied on Henderson’s testimony and police testimony that Davis was present at the dope house and felt guilty, plus Davis’s post‑arrest confirmation of that statement after requesting counsel.
Ringstad, a former cellmate, testified that Davis confessed; Griffin and Reed testified postconviction that Henderson admitted Davis was not present, contradicting trial testimony.
The trial court held Edwards error occurred with Davis’s post‑statement confirmation but deemed it harmless; the postconviction court denied relief.
Davis sought postconviction relief under Wis. Stat. § 974.06 alleging ineffective assistance, ineffective prior counsel, and newly discovered evidence; evidence from Griffin, Reed, and Winkler emerged at hearings.
The court concluded the real controversy—Davis’s actual participation in the robbery and murder—was not fully tried due to the Edwards violation and newly discovered, conflicting testimony.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Edwards suppression effect on trial	Davis claims the post‑Edwards confirmation was improperly admitted.	Davis’s confession itself was admissible; the post‑counsel confirmation should be suppressed only.	Edwards error cannot be harmless given postconviction evidence; reversal warranted.
Effect of newly discovered testimony on guilt	Griffin, Reed, and Winkler testimony impeaches Henderson and supports alternative innocence.	Impeachment is insufficient to overturn verdict.	Testimony from Griffin, Reed, and Winkler directly contradicts trial evidence and warrants new trial in interest of justice.
Impact of Ringstad to Winkler testimony	Ringstad’s statements to Winkler about Davis’s involvement create credible alternate theories.	Winkler’s testimony is unreliable and circumstantial.	Ringstad/Winkler testimony undermines the State’s theory and supports needing a new trial.
Authority to reverse under Wis. Stat. § 752.35	Discretionary reversal is appropriate to ensure justice.	Allen II limits reversal power in § 974.06 postconviction context.	Court relies on Vollmer and § 752.35 to reverse and remand for a new trial.

Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1981) (prohibits custodial interrogation after request for counsel absent self-initiated progression)
Vollmer v. Luety, 156 Wis. 2d 1 (Wis. 1990) (broad discretionary reversal power to do justice in individual cases)
State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681 (Wis. 1985) (real controversy not fully tried affects reversal analysis)
State v. Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d 150 (Wis. 1996) (standards for discretionary reversal under § 752.35)
State v. Allen, 159 Wis. 2d 53 (Ct. App. 1990) (direct vs. § 974.06 reversal contexts and limits)
State v. Armstrong, 283 Wis. 2d 639 (Wis. 2005) (coextensive discretionary reversal authority with supreme court)
State v. Henley, 328 Wis. 2d 544 (Wis. 2010) (discretionary reversal authority under § 752.35 analyzed)