State v. Davis, 182 Wash. 2d 222

On Nov. 29, 2009 Maurice Clemmons shot and killed four Lakewood police officers, then fled to the home of Letrecia Nelson; Eddie Lee Davis drove Clemmons there and remained present. Clemmons was treated, changed clothes, and left with a stolen officer's handgun.
Nelson retrieved a shopping bag, placed the stolen gun (and clothes) in it, and left the bag on a counter; when Clemmons later asked where the gun was Davis said "it's in the bag" and handed the bag to Clemmons.
Davis and Nelson were convicted of first‑degree rendering criminal assistance and possession of a stolen firearm; Davis was also convicted of second‑degree unlawful possession of a firearm.
The jury found an aggravating factor under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(r) — that the offenses “involved a destructive and foreseeable impact on persons other than the victim” — and the trial court imposed exceptional sentences for the rendering criminal assistance convictions.
Parties appealed: Davis and Nelson challenged sufficiency of the evidence as to firearm possession and the legal/factual basis for the exceptional sentences. The Supreme Court granted review.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Davis/Nelson)	Held
1. Sufficiency of evidence that Davis and Nelson possessed the stolen gun	The evidence (Nelson placing gun in bag; Davis identifying bag and handing it to Clemmons) permits inference of actual or constructive possession	At most proximity and momentary handling; insufficient to show dominion/control (actual or constructive possession)	Lead opinion (plurality) would find evidence sufficient; majority outcome does not adopt that view — the Court is divided (concurrence/dissent disagree on sufficiency).
2. Legality of exceptional sentences based on RCW 9.94A.535(3)(r) for rendering criminal assistance	Aggravator applies because officers' families suffered destructive/foreseeable impact beyond society generally	Rendering criminal assistance victimizes the general public; "victim" therefore includes everyone so the phrase "persons other than the victim" cannot apply — aggravator cannot lawfully justify exceptional sentence	Court (8‑justice majority) holds the aggravator cannot apply to rendering criminal assistance as a matter of law; exceptional sentences reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

In re Pers. Restraint of Martinez, 171 Wn.2d 354 (deferential standard for sufficiency review)
State v. Hosier, 157 Wn.2d 1 (standard for reviewing evidence in light most favorable to State)
State v. Callahan, 77 Wn.2d 27 (distinguishes passing/momentary handling from possession)
State v. Staley, 123 Wn.2d 794 (possession requires more than passing control; totality of circumstances)
State v. Stubbs, 170 Wn.2d 117 (role of statutory aggravators and exceptional sentences)
State v. Partin, 88 Wn.2d 899 (constructive possession via dominion and control over premises)
State v. Haddock, 141 Wn.2d 103 (crimes as offenses against the general public)
State v. Sweat, 180 Wn.2d 156 (context can affect the definition of "victim" under SRA)