State v. Davis
139 Ohio St. 3d 122
Ohio2014Background
- Davis murdered Suzette Butler on December 12, 1983 while on parole and was sentenced to death by a three-judge panel for aggravated murder with prior-conviction and death specifications.
- Lovette bought a Raven pistol with Davis’s money; Davis later obtained ammunition and loaded the gun under the driver’s seat before driving around with a companion.
- Butler was killed at the American Legion post after Davis and Butler had separated; witnesses Denmark and Massey identified Davis as the shooter.
- Autopsy showed multiple gunshot wounds to Butler’s head from a gun fired at close range; shell casings and bullets matched the Raven/Astra line.
- Davis was initially tried in 1984 before a three-judge panel; after Davis I and II, resentencing occurred in 1989 and 2009, with the present appeal challenging five propositions of law concerning the resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Withdrawal of jury waiver for resentencing | Davis seeks to withdraw his 1984 jury waiver for the 2009 resentencing. | Davis argues the waiver may be withdrawn due to changed circumstances and legal changes since 1984. | The court rejects the withdrawal request on the merits; law-of-the-case/res judicata do not bar review of the withdrawal claim, but the statutory rule governs resentencing without a jury. |
| Weight given to mitigating evidence | Davis contends the panel gave insufficient weight to mitigating evidence. | Panel may consider evidence and determine weight; no requirement to assign specific weight to each factor. | Eddings requires consideration, not a fixed weight; the panel’s weighing was permissible and not unconstitutional. |
| Retroactivity and Ex Post Facto | Applying amended RC 2929.06(B) to a pre-enactment murder violates retroactivity and the Ex Post Facto Clause. | Amendment is remedial and retroactively applicable; it does not increase punishment or impair vested rights. | RC 2929.06(B) is retroactive and remedial; its application does not violate the Ohio Retroactivity Clause or the U.S. Ex Post Facto Clause. |
| Delay in execution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment | Long delays and conditions of confinement render execution cruel and unusual. | Delay is not unconstitutional; cost considerations and due-process concerns do not render the delay cruel or unusual. | |
| Independent sentence review sufficiency of aggravating vs. mitigating factors | The aggravating factor of prior murder outweighed mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. | Mitigating evidence (family background, disorders, good behavior, remorse) undermines weight, but the court must independently weigh. | Aggravating factor outweighed mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt; sentence affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Davis, 38 Ohio St.3d 361 (1988) (Davis I; prior penalty-phase error and remand guidance)
- State v. Davis, 63 Ohio St.3d 44 (1992) (Davis II; remanding for resentencing and law-of-the-case discussion)
- State v. White, 132 Ohio St.3d 344 (2012) (retroactivity/remedial nature of RC 2929.06(B))
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (counsel's duty to advise on collateral consequences; inapplicable to jury waiver)
- Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984) (Sixth Amendment permits judge-alone capital sentencing)
- Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504 (1995) (no fixed weight required for mitigating factors)
- Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (sentencer must consider, not necessarily weigh, mitigating evidence)
- Raglin, State v. Raglin, 83 Ohio St.3d 253 (1998) (mitigation factors receive limited weight when offense was calculational)