State v. Davila, 357 P.3d 636

Background

In 2007 John Allen was fatally assaulted with a baseball bat; police recovered the bat and later swabs (Swab D) and swabs from the car/steering wheel (Item 24).
Denise Olson (WSPL Crime Lab) initially tested Swab D and Item 24; Olson reported Swab D contained a major contributor "Unknown A" and Item 24 was inconclusive for that profile.
In 2011 a CODIS match identified "Unknown A" as Julio Davila; supervising scientist Lorraine Heath retested the samples and confirmed Olson’s results (Swab D matched Davila; Item 24 remained inconclusive).
Davila was tried and convicted of second-degree murder; after conviction defense learned Olson had been fired for repeated incompetence and audits had produced Brady notices to prosecutors in other cases.
Davila moved for a new trial claiming Brady suppression; trial court held evidentiary hearings, required the defense to show factual support for contamination theory, and ultimately denied the motion for lack of evidence that Olson’s incompetence could have contaminated Swab D.
The Court of Appeals and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed: the nondisclosed information was favorable and was suppressed, but not material under Brady given the record (no evidence contamination was likely).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Davila)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether Crime Lab records showing Olson’s incompetence were Brady material	Olson’s termination impeaches lab credibility and could support contamination theory undermining DNA evidence; nondisclosure deprived him of a different defense strategy	Lab supervisor retested and confirmed results; defense could have discovered Olson’s issues with due diligence; suppression not material	Evidence of Olson’s incompetence was favorable and suppressed, but not material because defense failed to show a reasonable probability of contamination that would undermine confidence in the verdict
Whether the State suppressed the Crime Lab information for Brady purposes	The Crime Lab is an arm of the State; its knowledge is imputed to prosecutors and nondisclosure is suppression	Defense should have vetted potential witness; listing Olson as witness would have put defense on notice	Suppression established: Crime Lab knowledge is imputed to prosecution and the State had duty to disclose; defense did not waive Brady protections
Standard of review for Brady materiality	Broad de novo review of legal standard; trial court applied too narrow contamination-only test	Trial court’s factual findings deserve deference; legal question reviewed de novo	Materiality is legal (reviewed de novo) but underlying factual findings reviewed for substantial evidence; trial court applied correct legal standard given record
Whether impeachment evidence alone (Olson’s firing) required a new trial	Impeachment of lab personnel could change trial strategy and jury credibility assessment	Absent a factual link between Olson’s errors and evidence used at trial, impeachment value alone is insufficient to satisfy Brady materiality	Impeachment value matters but is not dispositive; here impeachment did not create reasonable probability of a different outcome without evidence contamination was plausible

Key Cases Cited

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose favorable material evidence to defendant)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (Brady materiality: reasonable probability the result would differ)
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (materiality standard for nondisclosed impeachment evidence)
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) (Brady framework: favorable, suppressed, material)
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (imputing knowledge among prosecution team)
In re Personal Restraint of Stenson, 174 Wn.2d 474 (2012) (Brady analysis in context of mishandled forensic evidence)
State v. Mullen, 171 Wn.2d 881 (2011) (Brady review is de novo; factual findings considered)
Aguilar v. Woodford, 725 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2013) (undisclosed reliability problems with forensic identification can be material)
Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2002) (suppressed impeachment evidence about witness credibility can be material)
Amado v. Gonzalez, 758 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2014) (Brady violated where suppressed evidence would have suggested alternate motive for witness)