State v. David Aaron Knutsen, 158 Idaho 199

Background:

Victim (22, full-scale IQ 72, borderline intellectual functioning) was an inpatient in a psychiatric hospital; defendant (31) was another patient who briefly checked in for medication adjustment.
In the hospital cafeteria and adjacent areas (partially visible from nursing station), defendant engaged in multiple sexual contacts with the victim: touching her breasts and genitals (with hand and foot), having her touch his penis, and other contact. Victim reported after defendant left.
Grand jury indicted defendant on four counts of Sexual Abuse of a Vulnerable Adult; indictment returned March 25, 2009. Jury convicted on all four counts; sentences for each count were concurrent to each other but consecutive to a prior sentence.
Pretrial challenges included: grand jury term expiration, facial and as‑applied vagueness of I.C. § 18‑1505B (definition of “vulnerable adult”), overbreadth/association (Lawrence), equal protection (marriage exemption), and that consent was a defense.
On appeal the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, addressing each constitutional and evidentiary claim.

Issues:

Issue	State's Argument	Knutsen's Argument	Held
Whether grand jury term had expired before indictment	Grand jury term began when first convened to inquire (Dec 3, 2008); term not expired on Mar 25, 2009	Term began when jurors were impaneled (Nov 14, 2008); indictment void if term expired	Court upheld district court: term commenced when convened to inquire (Dec 3), so indictment valid
Whether I.C. § 18‑1505B is unconstitutionally vague (definition of vulnerable adult)	Statute gives adequate, specific criteria (mental/physical impairment affecting judgment/decision‑making)	Definition too indefinite to give fair notice or guide enforcement	Statute not unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied; gave adequate notice and enforcement guidelines
Whether § 18‑1505B is overbroad / infringes right of association (Lawrence)	Statute targets nonconsensual abuse of adults legally unable to consent; serves legitimate state interest in protecting vulnerable adults	Lawrence protects private consensual adult sexual conduct; statute infringes association/sexual liberty	Lawrence limited to private consensual conduct; statute does not prohibit protected conduct here (victim legally unable to consent; acts were not private); statute not overbroad
Whether statute violates Equal Protection (alleged marriage exemption)	No marriage exemption exists in the statute; law applies neutrally	Claimed sexual conduct between married couples exempted, raising equal protection issue	No textual basis for marriage exemption; equal protection claim fails
Whether jury instruction that consent is not a defense was erroneous	Victim defined by statute as unable to consent as a matter of law; consent not a defense	Objected to instruction that consent is not a defense	Instruction proper because vulnerable adults (as statutorily defined) cannot consent; no error
Whether evidence was insufficient to prove victim was a vulnerable adult	Presented psychologist testimony, IQ 72, processing deficits, guardian appointment, and victim testimony	Expert testimony that victim could understand some sexual information and had graduated high school argued insufficient	Evidence viewed in state’s favor was substantial and competent to support finding victim met statutory definition
Whether sentencing on four counts was double punishment for same crime	State relied on separate acts and statutory framework	Argued acts were one continuous incident so multiple punishments violate double jeopardy	Court declined to apply prior statutory test (I.C. § 18‑301, repealed); defendant failed to show unwaived constitutional error; sentencing affirmed

Key Cases Cited

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (void‑for‑vagueness doctrine and law‑enforcement guidelines)
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (challenger cannot complain of vagueness as applied to others when conduct is clearly proscribed)
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (scope limited to private consensual adult sexual conduct)
Anderson v. Morrow, 371 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir.) (statute defining incapacity provided sufficient notice)
State v. Major, 111 Idaho 410 (Idaho 1986) (discussion of aggregation/division of conduct under repealed statutory scheme)
State v. McCormick, 100 Idaho 111 (Idaho 1979) (analysis of separate acts under prior statute)
State v. Herr, 97 Idaho 783 (Idaho 1976) (consent not a defense where law deems victim incapable)
State v. Schwartzmiller, 107 Idaho 89 (Idaho 1984) (consent not a defense for lewd conduct with minor)
State v. Oar, 129 Idaho 337 (Idaho 1996) (consent not a defense for sexual battery of certain minors)