State v. Dansdill, 443 P.3d 990

Background

In May 2014 Patrick Dansdill went to M.L.’s residence seeking repayment of a $300 loan; a gun was fired through a closed door, killing R.G. inside. Dansdill fled.
Initial charge was second-degree murder; a later indictment added first‑degree felony murder (alternative to second‑degree) and attempted armed robbery. Trial resulted in convictions for felony murder and attempted armed robbery; life sentence plus concurrent 7.5 years.
At trial principal evidence of intent to rob came from two intoxicated, inconsistent witnesses (M.L. and M.G.); M.L. had earlier told police Dansdill threatened them, but at trial recanted memory.
Defense moved to dismiss the superseding indictment for prosecutorial vindictiveness after pretrial defense interviews suggested a third‑party shooter theory; prosecutor explained the re‑indictment was strategic to counter that theory.
During closing, prosecutor twice characterized felony murder as a "lesser/less serious" form of murder and, in rebuttal, made comments that arguably highlighted the defendant as a potential witness; objections were overruled and mistrial denied.
Court of Appeals reversed convictions and remanded for a new trial based on improper prosecutorial argument about felony murder’s "seriousness," finding the error not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the close, contested evidence and other instructional issues.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Prosecutorial vindictiveness for superseding indictment	State re‑indicted with felony murder to punish defense for exercising pretrial interview/right to develop defense	Re‑charging was strategic response to defense theory revealed in pretrial interviews, not vindictive	No presumption of vindictiveness; trial court did not abuse discretion in denying dismissal
Sufficiency of evidence for attempted armed robbery	State: threats, pounding on door, display/use of gun toward victims supported attempted armed robbery as property of another under §13‑1801(13)	Dansdill: he only sought repayment of his own $300 (claim‑of‑right), so no animus furandi; insufficient evidence	Evidence sufficient to submit attempted armed robbery to jury under statutory definition that includes property in which defendant also has an interest
Improper summation: calling felony murder "less serious"	Prosecutor argued felony murder is less serious than premeditated murder, implying lesser punishment and diminishing burdens/concerns	Prosecutor claimed he meant only moral culpability/that felony murder does not require intent; not meant to reference punishment	Remarks were improper; jury could reasonably interpret "less serious/lesser" as referring to punishment; trial court erred in overruling objection
Rebuttal argument and reference to defendant not testifying	Prosecutor’s rebuttal pointed to missing witnesses and suggested defendant (who did not testify) would have produced them, shifting burden/punishing silence	Prosecutor was properly rebutting defense counsel’s argument about absence of witnesses and emphasizing equal access to witnesses; comments not intended as comment on silence	Majority of rebuttal was proper but portions could be read as commenting on silence; under the circumstances (defense opened topic), not reversible error here

Key Cases Cited

Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (U.S. 1974) (presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness where realistic likelihood of vindictiveness exists)
United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (U.S. 1982) (prosecutor free to respond to defense developments pretrial; no inflexible presumption of vindictiveness)
Mieg v. State, 225 Ariz. 445 (App. 2010) (standard for prima facie showing and burden shift in vindictiveness claims)
Bauer v. State, 45 Ariz. 358 (Ariz. 1935) (traditional claim‑of‑right rule barring robbery charge when taking to collect bona fide debt)
State v. Lewis, 121 Ariz. 155 (App. 1978) (adopts narrower view consistent with §13‑1801(13) that taking money by force to apply to a debt can support robbery)
State v. Schaefer, 163 Ariz. 626 (App. 1990) (discussion suggesting claim‑of‑right defense may be abrogated by statutory change)
State v. Lua, 237 Ariz. 301 (Ariz. 2015) (statutory scheme distinguishes offenses by seriousness and requires appropriate jury instructions for alternatives)
State v. LeBlanc, 186 Ariz. 437 (Ariz. 1996) (proper jury instruction when offenses are lesser‑included; LeBlanc instruction inappropriate for alternative, non‑lesser counts)
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (U.S. 1965) (prohibition on prosecutorial comment on defendant’s failure to testify)