191 Conn. App. 33
Conn. App. Ct.2019Background
- On Dec. 4, 2014 a white BMW struck Evelyn Agyei’s Subaru twice (side then rear), causing the Subaru to hit a tree; Agyei died and her son was injured. Police identified and arrested Patricia Daniels as the BMW driver.
- Daniels was tried by jury and convicted of: intentional manslaughter (§ 53a-55(a)(1)), reckless manslaughter (§ 53a-55(a)(3)), and misconduct with a motor vehicle (criminally negligent operation, § 53a-57(a)), among other counts.
- At sentencing the state moved to vacate the intentional manslaughter conviction and the trial court did so; the court then sentenced Daniels on the remaining counts.
- On appeal Daniels argued the jury’s guilty verdicts were legally inconsistent because the offenses require mutually exclusive mental states, and also that testimonial hearsay was admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause.
- The appellate court examined (1) whether convictions were legally inconsistent under the theory the state presented at trial, and (2) whether a dealer employee’s identification of the vehicle model (recounted by a detective) was testimonial hearsay.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Daniels' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether intentional manslaughter and reckless manslaughter convictions are legally inconsistent | The crimes were charged in the alternative; jury could convict both or either | Verdicts are inconsistent because one cannot be both intentional and reckless as to the same act/victim | Not inconsistent: mens rea elements relate to different results (intent to cause serious injury vs. conscious disregard of risk of death); jury could permissibly find both mental states concurrently |
| Whether intentional manslaughter and criminally negligent operation convictions are legally inconsistent | Mens rea differ and can coexist under the facts; no mutual exclusivity | Verdicts inconsistent because intent and failure to perceive risk cannot both apply | Not inconsistent: intent to cause serious injury and failure to perceive risk (criminal negligence) relate to different results and can coexist |
| Whether reckless manslaughter and criminally negligent operation convictions are legally inconsistent | On appeal, state argued each strike could be a separate act with separate mens rea | Verdicts inconsistent because the state tried the case as one continuous act; recklessness (conscious disregard) and criminal negligence (failure to perceive) are mutually exclusive regarding same result | Inconsistent: under the trial theory (one continuous act) the mental states are mutually exclusive; convictions for both vacated and retrial ordered on manslaughter (intentional and reckless) and misconduct with a motor vehicle |
| Whether detective’s testimony repeating dealership employee’s model ID was inadmissible testimonial hearsay | Testimony was non-hearsay (offered to show investigative steps / effect on officers), not offered for truth; thus no Confrontation Clause problem | Admission violated Confrontation Clause because Daniels could not cross-examine dealership employee about the identification | Not reviewable as constitutional error under Golding: statement not hearsay (offered to show effect on listener/investigation) and thus raised no Confrontation Clause issue |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Nash, 114 A.3d 128 (Conn. 2015) (mens rea elements that relate to different results can support concurrent convictions)
- State v. Chyung, 157 A.3d 628 (Conn. 2017) (a defendant cannot act both intentionally and recklessly as to the same act/result)
- State v. King, 583 A.2d 896 (Conn. 1990) (convictions requiring mutually exclusive mental states cannot both stand)
- State v. Polanco, 61 A.3d 1084 (Conn. 2013) (vacatur as remedy for cumulative convictions violating double jeopardy)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (testimonial hearsay implicates Confrontation Clause)
- Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (primary-purpose test distinguishes testimonial from nontestimonial statements)