198 A.3d 521
R.I.2019Background
- In October 2011 Danielle LeFebvre brought her seven‑week‑old son James to the ER with serious injuries (skull fracture, intracranial bleeding, and fractured ribs); she was later charged with first‑degree child abuse under § 11‑9‑5.3(b)(1).
- Shortly after the injuries LeFebvre sought psychiatric evaluation at Butler Hospital; intake notes by social worker Sheila Russell contained statements suggesting LeFebvre had been “enraged” and may have caused the harm.
- The State obtained those mental‑health records during plea negotiations, moved in limine to use them at trial, and subpoenaed Russell to testify; the trial justice denied Butler Hospital’s motion to quash and admitted the records/testimony over LeFebvre’s objections.
- LeFebvre contended her statements to Russell were privileged under the Confidentiality of Health Care Information Act (CHCIA), G.L. 5‑37.3, and thus inadmissible.
- The State invoked G.L. 40‑11‑11, which abrogates certain privileges “in situations involving known or suspected child abuse or neglect” and bars invoking privilege to avoid giving evidence in “any judicial proceeding relating to child abuse or neglect.”
- The Superior Court admitted Russell’s testimony; LeFebvre was convicted and sentenced. On appeal she argued CHCIA privilege should have barred admission and that § 40‑11‑11 does not abrogate CHCIA in criminal proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (LeFebvre) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether CHCIA protected LeFebvre’s statements to a clinical social worker | § 40‑11‑11 abrogates CHCIA privilege for communications involving known/suspected child abuse, so statements are admissible | CHCIA made Russell a "health care provider" and intake statements were confidential; privilege bars testimony | Held: CHCIA privilege, even if present, is abrogated by § 40‑11‑11 in proceedings relating to child abuse, so testimony admissible |
| Whether § 40‑11‑11 applies only to Family Court abuse/neglect calendar proceedings | Statute’s plain text says “any judicial proceeding relating to child abuse or neglect,” covering all courts and proceedings | Argues phrase is a term of art limited to DCYF/Family Court abuse & neglect calendar proceedings | Held: Statute unambiguous; “any judicial proceeding relating to child abuse or neglect” covers criminal proceedings as well |
| Whether the second sentence of § 40‑11‑11 limits the first sentence’s scope | Second sentence addresses a distinct Family Court subject‑matter limit; does not narrow the first sentence | Second sentence shows legislature intended limits to apply only in Family Court, so first sentence should be read similarly | Held: Sentences have separate meanings; second sentence narrows confidentiality only in Family Court for listed subject matter and does not restrict the first sentence’s broad abrogation |
| Whether LeFebvre waived or preserved the privilege claim | State argued counsel’s initial acquiescence waived the claim | Defense obtained a continuing objection and later renewed challenge | Held: Continuing objection preserved the issue for appellate review |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479 (R.I. 2013) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
- State v. Marsich, 10 A.3d 435 (R.I. 2010) (apply plain meaning when statute unambiguous)
- State v. Clark, 974 A.2d 558 (R.I. 2009) (presumption that each statutory word has significance)
- State v. Almonte, 644 A.2d 295 (R.I. 1994) (prior constitutional analysis of CHCIA privilege)
- In re Doe, 717 A.2d 1129 (R.I. 1998) (statutory amendment resolved prior constitutional concerns about health‑care confidentiality)
- Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940) (deference to legislative policy choices on statutory design)