State v. Daniel William Leary, 160 Idaho 349

Daniel Leary pled guilty in 2012 to felony possession and received a sentence up to seven years; the court withheld or suspended portions of the judgment at various times and repeatedly placed him on probation with program participation and possible incarceration as conditions.
The district court’s orders informed Leary that time spent on probation was not credited against the underlying incarceration unless not imposed as a condition of probation; various orders credited him with incremental days served at different stages.
Leary was admitted to Ada County Drug Court in 2014, then twice failed to appear, generating two drug-court bench warrants; he served time on those warrants and other bench warrants related to probation violations.
In March 2015 the district court revoked probation, imposed the original sentence, and declined to credit time served while Leary was in custody pursuant to conditions of probation; total credited days were 526.
Leary appealed, arguing that 2015 amendments to Idaho Code §§ 18-309 and 19-2603 (the “Credit Statutes”)—which expressly allowed credit for time served as a condition of probation—should apply retroactively so he would receive credit for time spent on the drug-court bench warrants.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 2015 amendments to the Credit Statutes apply retroactively	Leary: the amendments make time served as a condition of probation creditable and should be given retroactive effect to include time on the drug-court warrants	State: statutes are prospective; no express legislative intent makes the amendments retroactive, so prior decisions need not be recalculated	The amended statutes are not retroactive; the district court correctly refused to apply them to pre-amendment conduct

Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 318 P.3d 918 (statutes are presumed prospective; retroactivity requires clear legislative intent)
State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 343 P.3d 30 (statutory interpretation principles and plain-language review)
State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 313 P.3d 1 (interpretation begins with statutory language; give words ordinary meaning)
Doe v. Boy Scouts of America, 148 Idaho 427, 224 P.3d 494 (when statute ambiguous, examine legislative history and policy)
Nebeker v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 113 Idaho 609, 747 P.2d 18 (statutory amendments not retroactive absent express declaration)