State v. Dalton, 369 N.C. 311

Background

Melissa Dalton stabbed two neighbors, killing one, on August 21, 2009; she was indicted for first-degree murder, burglary, and assault.
Dalton asserted a not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity defense; defense experts testified she was manic (linked to SSRI and substance use) and that her mental illness and addiction are chronic. The State presented no psychiatric experts.
During the charge conference the prosecutor sought permission to comment on civil-commitment procedures following an insanity acquittal; the judge permitted comment but cautioned against misstating release prospects.
In closing the prosecutor told the jury it was “very possible” Dalton could be released and “back home in less than two months” if she proved by a preponderance at the 50-day hearing she was not dangerous; the trial court overruled an objection to that remark.
The jury convicted Dalton of first-degree murder (felony-murder theory) and related offenses; Dalton appealed, and the Court of Appeals granted a new trial, holding the prosecutor’s release-comments were prejudicial. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Dalton)	Held
Whether prosecutor’s closing remarks that it was “very possible” defendant could be released within 50 days after an insanity acquittal were proper	Remarks were a permissible statement of law/context and not prejudicial; the portions not objected to should be reviewed for gross impropriety	Remarks misstated law/fact and improperly exaggerated likelihood of release, prejudicing the insanity defense	Remarks were improper and prejudicial; Court affirms Court of Appeals and grants new trial
Appropriate standard of review for the remarks	Second remark (no contemporaneous objection) should be reviewed for gross impropriety	Entire remark should be reviewed for abuse of discretion because context and sequence tied statements together and objection addressed the comment as a whole	Reviewed under abuse-of-discretion standard; the two statements viewed together were improper
Whether prior case law (Millsaps, Allen) controls	Allen limits prejudice finding; Millsaps is distinguishable	Millsaps controls: prosecutor must have evidentiary support for claims about post-acquittal release	Millsaps applicable: prosecutor’s comments lacked evidentiary support and were impermissibly prejudicial; Allen is distinguishable
Whether the improper remarks created a reasonable possibility of a different verdict	State: no — jury instruction and minor misstatement cured any error; defendant could not show reasonable possibility of different outcome	Defendant: remarks likely discouraged insanity verdict by suggesting routine early release, creating reasonable possibility of a different result	Court: prejudice shown — reasonable possibility exists that jury would have returned an insanity verdict absent the improper remarks; new trial ordered

Key Cases Cited

State v. Millsaps, 169 N.C. App. 340, 610 S.E.2d 437 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (prosecutor’s unsupported comments about likelihood of post-acquittal release found impermissibly prejudicial)
State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 367 S.E.2d 626 (N.C. 1988) (misstatement of law in closing reviewed for gross impropriety but did not amount to prejudicial error on those facts)
State v. Hammonds, 290 N.C. 1, 224 S.E.2d 595 (N.C. 1976) (trial court must instruct jury on commitment procedures after an insanity plea to avoid juror confusion and fear for community safety)
State v. Jones, 355 N.C. 117, 558 S.E.2d 97 (N.C. 2002) (standards for reviewing propriety and prejudice of closing-argument remarks)
State v. Ratliff, 341 N.C. 610, 461 S.E.2d 325 (N.C. 1995) (incorrect statements of law in closing argument are improper)