State v. DailÂ, 255 N.C. App. 645

Background

Defendant Travis Taylor Dail pleaded guilty to DWI and felony possession of LSD per a plea agreement that dismissed several other drug charges and stipulated probation.
At sentencing the trial court entered a suspended prison sentence and 12 months supervised probation on the LSD offense, and a suspended confinement sentence on the DWI.
Defense counsel repeatedly requested conditional discharge under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-96 (first-time drug offender deferral), and offered to submit paperwork; the court refused, stating defendant already received the benefit of dismissals.
The prosecutor did not state that defendant was "inappropriate" for § 90-96; later the ADA submitted an affidavit acknowledging no written findings had been made and not asserting inappropriateness.
Defendant moved for appropriate relief (MAR) alleging the court erred by refusing conditional discharge and failing to make written findings; the MAR was denied and defendant appealed.
The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded for resentencing, holding the trial court must follow statutory procedures to determine § 90-96 eligibility.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court was required to enter conditional discharge under § 90-96 for an eligible first-time offender who consents	The court need not impose § 90-96 absent proof defendant qualifies; burden should be on defendant to show eligibility	Defendant argued he was eligible, consented at plea, and statute's "shall" mandates conditional discharge absent written findings and ADA agreement	Court held § 90-96's "shall" is mandatory where defendant is eligible and consents; failure to follow statute is reversible error and remanded for resentencing
Allocation of burden to prove prior convictions when § 90-96 is silent	Burden should rest on defendant to prove lack of disqualifying prior convictions	Defendant argued general sentencing statutes place burden on State to prove prior convictions	Court held general sentencing statute (Chapter 15A) applies per Burns, so State bears burden to prove disqualifying prior convictions
Whether trial court needed to make written findings and ADA agreement to deny § 90-96	Trial court argued plea agreement and dismissals undercut conditional discharge and refused without formal findings	Defendant argued court failed to make required written findings and obtain ADA agreement as § 90-96 contemplates	Court vacated judgment and remanded to require statutory procedures (report from AOC/form and written findings if denial)
Whether denial of MAR and sentencing orders were appealable	State argued appellate jurisdiction lacking over MAR denial	Defendant sought certiorari and appeal; Supreme Court denied stay and certiorari, allowing appeal	Court proceeded to review and remanded for resentencing on the § 90-96 issue

Key Cases Cited

State v. Jones, 237 N.C. App. 526 (discussing de novo review of statutory interpretation)
State v. Largent, 197 N.C. App. 614 (same principle on legal questions)
State v. Pimental, 153 N.C. App. 69 (limits on appellate review after guilty plea)
State v. Antone, 240 N.C. App. 408 (usage of "shall" is mandatory on trial judges)
In re Eades, 143 N.C. App. 712 (same rule on mandatory statutory language)
State v. Burns, 171 N.C. App. 759 (Chapter 15A probation/sentencing procedures fill gaps in § 90-96)