State v. D. Dineen, 469 P.3d 122

Background

On August 14, 2017, Dineen and his girlfriend Jena Curtiss had a physical altercation at home; Dineen acknowledged placing his hand over Jena’s mouth but denied covering her nose or knowingly impeding her breathing.
Immediately after the incident Jena told her mother, sister, a CFS worker, and responding police officer that Dineen had covered her nose and mouth, held her face into the mattress, and she “couldn’t breathe.”
Medical/observational corroboration included bruising, a swollen lip, a raspy voice, disheveled clothing, and Jena’s frightened, gasping demeanor; Dineen also texted and called repeatedly and admitted to an officer he had “covered her mouth up” for several seconds.
A Yellowstone County jury convicted Dineen of felony strangulation (Mont. Code Ann. § 45‑5‑215(1)(b)).
On appeal Dineen argued (1) insufficient evidence because the conviction relied on Jena’s prior inconsistent statements; (2) ineffective assistance because defense counsel’s cross-examination “opened the door” to prejudicial prior‑violence testimony; and (3) plain error in a jury instruction on mental state.
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, rejecting Dineen’s insufficiency, IAC (no Strickland prejudice), and plain‑error claims.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Dineen's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence for felony strangulation (impeding breathing by blocking nose and mouth)	Prior inconsistent statements are admissible substantively and, combined with circumstantial corroboration (demeanor, injuries, texts, admissions), supported the jury’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt.	The conviction rests only on Jena’s prior inconsistent statements; those alone cannot prove the required element (covering her nose) and thus evidence was insufficient.	Affirmed. Court held prior inconsistent statements may be corroborated by circumstantial evidence and that the total record permitted a rational juror to find purposeful/knowing impediment of breathing.
Ineffective assistance for allegedly "opening the door" to prior‑violence testimony	Defense counsel’s cross‑questioning did open the door; but even assuming error, Dineen failed to show a reasonable probability of a different outcome (no Strickland prejudice).	Counsel’s question was a mistake that admitted prejudicial 404(b) evidence; this deficient performance likely changed the outcome (prejudice).	Affirmed. Court found no reasonable probability of a different result absent the testimony; Justice Shea concurred but would resolve on lack of deficient performance.
Plain error in jury instruction using § 45‑2‑201(2) language on substituted/variant harm	State notes Dineen proposed the instruction and jury was properly instructed overall; no plain error warranting reversal.	Instruction relieved State of proving the required mental state for strangulation and thus implicated fundamental fairness.	No plain‑error relief. Court declined to invoke plain error after reviewing instructions and record.

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two‑part deficient performance and prejudice test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
City of Helena v. Strobel, 390 P.3d 921 (Mont. 2017) (prior inconsistent statements admissible substantively but cannot alone prove an element; require corroboration)
State v. McAlister, 365 P.3d 1062 (Mont. 2016) (standard for reviewing motions to dismiss for insufficient evidence)
State v. Laird, 447 P.3d 416 (Mont. 2019) (de novo review of sufficiency challenges)
State v. Torres, 299 P.3d 804 (Mont. 2013) (same rule on prior inconsistent statements and corroboration)
Jones v. All Star Painting, Inc., 415 P.3d 986 (Mont. 2018) (circumstantial evidence can corroborate and support an inference as to an element)
State v. Polak, 422 P.3d 112 (Mont. 2018) (insufficient evidence requires judgment of acquittal)
State v. Trujillo, 180 P.3d 1153 (Mont. 2008) (standard that any rational trier of fact could find essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt)
State v. Lehrkamp, 400 P.3d 697 (Mont. 2017) ("reasonable probability" standard in prejudice inquiry under Strickland)