114 So. 3d 440
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2013Background
- State appeals trial court’s dismissal of information charging D.C. with unlawful sexual intercourse by a person knowingly infected with HIV.
- Information alleges transmission through sexual intercourse; defendant argued term sexual intercourse means heterosexual vaginal intercourse only; trial court granted dismissal.
- Statute at issue is 384.24(2), banning intercourse by an HIV-infected person who knows of transmission risk unless partner is informed and consents.
- Issue centers on the meaning of sexual intercourse; statute undefined; parties urge plain-language interpretation.
- Court explains legislative intent and adopts a broad plain meaning including vaginal, anal, and oral intercourse regardless of gender.
- Court reverses dismissal, remands for proceedings, and certifies conflict with L.A.P. v. State.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of sexual intercourse in 384.24(2)? | State argues plain meaning includes vaginal, anal, and oral intercourse. | D.C. contends term is limited to heterosexual vaginal intercourse. | Term includes vaginal, anal, and oral intercourse regardless of gender. |
Key Cases Cited
- L.A.P. v. State, 62 So.3d 693 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (held that §384.24(2) requires heterosexual intercourse)
- State v. Washington, 114 So.3d 182 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (trial court bound to LAP on issue)
- Deason v. Florida Dep't of Corrs., 705 So.2d 1374 (Fla.1998) (statutory construction to give effect to evident legislative intent)
- Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217 (Fla.1984) (plain meaning controls when language unambiguous)
- Diamond Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Horowitch, 107 So.3d 362 (Fla.2013) (court may resort to plain-meaning rules in unambiguous text)