205 A.3d 885
Me.2019Background
- On March 28, 2017 an officer followed a van leaving a parking area known for drug complaints; the van pulled over on a dark, lightly traveled residential street.
- The officer did not activate front emergency lights or siren while following; he later activated a rear light after the van stopped and approached the driver with a flashlight.
- When the officer approached, he observed a white powdery residue in Cunneen’s nostril and smelled alcohol; he then asked Cunneen to exit and place his hands on the van.
- Cunneen was uncooperative, repeatedly pulled away, shouted, and threw an object into a snowbank; later the officer retrieved a pill bottle from the snowbank containing hydrocodone and diazepam.
- Cunneen was indicted on multiple drug-possession counts and resisting arrest; he moved to suppress evidence from the roadside encounter claiming it was an unconstitutional detention.
- The suppression motion was denied; after a jury trial Cunneen was convicted on three counts and sentenced (one-year term with all but seven days suspended, probation, mandatory fines). Cunneen appealed denial of suppression and raised sentencing error claims.
Issues
| Issue | Cunneen's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the roadside encounter was a Fourth Amendment seizure requiring reasonable suspicion | Cunneen: officer’s following, turning around, approaching with flashlight and activating rear light constituted a show of authority; he was detained when contacted | State: no seizure until officer observed white powder in nostril; initial contact was consensual | Court: No seizure before officer observed white powder; officer’s conduct prior was a consensual encounter, investigatory detention justified after observation |
| Whether evidence (pill bottle and pills) should be suppressed as fruit of an unlawful detention | Cunneen: all evidence stemming from the encounter should be excluded | State: evidence obtained after lawful investigatory detention was admissible | Court: suppression denied; evidence admissible because detention was lawful when initiated |
| Whether the court double-counted resisting behavior as an aggravating factor in sentencing under 17-A M.R.S. § 1252-C | Cunneen: court considered his resisting behavior both in setting the basic sentence and again in setting maximum sentence (double counting) | State: sentencing consideration was proper; behavior was considered once for the Class C charge in step two; Cunneen actually recommended the sentence imposed | Court: No double-counting; sentencing claim not cognizable on direct appeal and, in any event, court considered conduct only in step two for the Class C sentence |
| Whether sentencing-process error is reviewable on direct appeal | Cunneen: challenges the court’s application of the §1252‑C framework | State: departures from the Hewey/§1252‑C process are not reviewable on direct appeal; remedy is sentence review panel | Court: Error (if any) required discretionary sentence-review application; claim is not reviewable on direct appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Collier, 66 A.3d 563 (Me. 2013) (objective seizure test and factors distinguishing consensual encounter from detention)
- State v. Ciomei, 127 A.3d 548 (Me. 2015) (Fourth Amendment seizure is judged objectively by whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave)
- State v. Gulick, 759 A.2d 1085 (Me. 2000) (police following a vehicle does not necessarily constitute a seizure)
- State v. Moulton, 704 A.2d 361 (Me. 1997) (observation of indicia of drug/alcohol use can justify investigatory detention)
- State v. Seamon, 165 A.3d 342 (Me. 2017) (sentence‑setting framework and limits on factual findings review)
- State v. Marquis, 181 A.3d 684 (Me. 2018) (standard of review for suppression rulings: factual findings for clear error, legal conclusions de novo)
- State v. Cunningham, 715 A.2d 156 (Me. 1998) (departure from Hewey/§1252‑C sentencing process is not reviewable on direct appeal)
