State v. Cummings, 243 P.3d 697

Cummings operated a home daycare and cared for 13-month-old K.H. on March 25, 2008.
K.H. was fed a bottle in the morning and moved between rooms to reduce disturbance to another sleeping child.
Around10 a.m., Cummings placed K.H. in a car seat in a laundry/restroom area with the top buckle fastened and did not check on her for over two hours.
K.H. died from strangulation while unattended in the car seat.
The State charged involuntary manslaughter based on the underlying crime of child endangerment; the jury convicted and the district court sentenced 32 months.
On appeal, Cummings challenged the jury instructions on specific/general intent and the meaning of reasonable probability.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether endangering a child requires specific intent	Cummings argues the statute requires specific intent to harm.	State contends endangering a child is a general intent crime.	Endangering a child is a general intent crime.
Whether the trial court should have given a general intent instruction	Cummings contends a general-intent instruction was warranted.	State asserts no need for such an instruction because general intent is implicit.	The court did not abuse by denying a general-intent instruction.
Whether the term reasonable probability was properly defined	Cummings argues the phrase should be defined as more than a faint/remote possibility and a likelihood.	State argues no definition beyond the post-Sharp standard is necessary and prudent to avoid confusion.	Post-Sharp definition applied; no reversible error.

State v. Fisher, 230 Kan. 192 (1981) (interpreted 'may' as reasonable probability in child endangerment)
State v. Sharp, 28 Kan. App.2d 128 (2000) (rejected 'might' as standard; required reasonable probability)
State v. Daniels, 278 Kan. 53 (2004) (upheld conviction using post-Sharp instruction to consider reasonable probability)
State v. Colston, 290 Kan. 952 (2010) (clear error standard for jury instruction impact)