State v. Culp, 152 A.3d 141

In 1999 Culp was convicted of first-degree murder and a firearm offense; that conviction was reversed on appeal. She was retried in 2001 and convicted of second-degree murder and PFDCF and sentenced to 20 years (Level V) for murder and 5 years (Level V) for the firearm count.
Culp filed an initial Rule 35(b) motion in 2003 (denied) and a postconviction motion in 2009 (denied). In October 2015 she filed a second pro se Rule 35(b) motion seeking sentence reduction based on extensive rehabilitative programming and remorse; she had served ~17 of 25 years.
The Superior Court granted the 2015 motion, finding Culp’s rehabilitative efforts constituted “extraordinary circumstances” excusing the untimeliness and reduced her term (modified to 20 years, suspended after 12, with other adjustments and supervision).
The State appealed, arguing the Superior Court abused its discretion because the motion was both repetitive (a prior Rule 35(b) had been filed) and untimely (filed >90 days after sentencing), and that program participation does not meet the Rule 35(b) extraordinary-circumstances standard.
The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed de novo the legal construction of Rule 35(b) and for abuse of discretion the Superior Court’s grant of relief, and reversed the Superior Court’s modification.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Superior Court could consider a second Rule 35(b) motion (repetitive motion bar).	State: Second motion is barred as repetitive; Rule 35(b) forbids consideration of repetitive requests.	Culp: A prior Rule 35(b) motion does not automatically preclude subsequent motions raising rehabilitative facts.	Reversed: Motion was repetitive; Superior Court abused discretion by ignoring Rule 35(b)’s prohibition on repetitive motions.
Whether rehabilitation/program participation counts as "extraordinary circumstances" to excuse an untimely (>90 days) Rule 35(b) filing.	State: Participation in programs and rehabilitation alone do not constitute extraordinary circumstances to excuse untimeliness; Rule 35(b) and §4217 provide other mechanisms.	Culp: Her extensive rehabilitative record justifies treating the motion as extraordinary despite the time bar.	Reversed: Rehabilitation alone is insufficient to establish extraordinary circumstances; untimely motion could not be justified under Rule 35(b). Relief must proceed through §4217 (DOC/Board of Parole) or Board of Pardons.

Culp v. State, 766 A.2d 486 (Del. 2001) (on appellate reversal of first conviction and scope of review)
State v. Lewis, 797 A.2d 1198 (Del. 2002) (standards for Rule 35(b) untimeliness and extraordinary-circumstances analysis)
Harper v. State, 970 A.2d 199 (Del. 2009) (definition of abuse of discretion review)
Heath v. State, 983 A.2d 77 (Del. 2009) (Board of Pardons and executive clemency process requirements)