96 A.3d 80
Me.2014Background
- Victim was stabbed multiple times in her apartment on December 10, 2011; she and an eyewitness (Karie Lessard) identified Cleveland Cruthirds as the assailant; victim suffered serious injuries and ongoing impairments.
- A 911 call (voices identified as victim and Cruthirds) and Lessard’s videotaped police interview (conducted ~1 hour after the attack) were introduced at trial.
- Police preserved the victim’s shirt but destroyed other bloody clothing (bra, underwear, sweatpants, sanitary pad) about eight days after the assault for storage/contamination reasons.
- Some police witness statements (three bouncers) were lost before discovery production; two bouncers nonetheless testified at trial.
- Cruthirds was convicted of elevated aggravated assault, burglary, and violating condition of release; he appealed challenging: (1) admission of Lessard’s videotaped statement as a recorded recollection, (2) exclusion of alternative-suspect evidence, (3) sanctions for discovery failures and due-process claims over destroyed clothing/witness statements, (4) refusal to give an adverse-inference instruction about destroyed evidence, and (5) limits on playing the 911 tape during initial cross-examination of a detective.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Cruthirds) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Lessard’s videotaped police interview under M.R. Evid. 803(5) (recorded recollection) | Lessard’s later testimony said she had no memory and suggested prior statements might be unreliable; thus video should be excluded as not a proper recorded recollection | Video was made ~1 hour after the event when memory was fresh, Lessard appeared coherent and detailed on the tape, and she later lacked present recollection — foundational requirements satisfied | Court affirmed admission; trial court did not abuse discretion in finding Rule 803(5) foundational elements met |
| Exclusion of alternative-suspect evidence (Deshawn) | Cruthirds sought to cross-examine about the victim’s relationship with Deshawn and argue he might be the attacker | State pointed to eyewitness ID, 911 call naming Cruthirds, and DNA corroboration; offered evidence of Deshawn’s connection was speculative | Exclusion affirmed: proffered evidence was too speculative and lacked a reasonable connection to the crime; no Confrontation Clause violation |
| Destruction of victim’s clothing (potential DNA) — due process under Trombetta/Bilynsky | Destroying bloody items deprived Cruthirds of exculpatory evidence and violated due process; trial court should exclude State’s DNA evidence or provide harsher sanction | Police preserved the shirt used in testing, destroyed other items for storage/contamination reasons; at the time there was no apparent exculpatory value or bad faith; destroyed items couldn’t be replicated | No due-process violation: defendant failed to show the destroyed items had apparent exculpatory value or that police acted in bad faith; trial court’s findings not clearly erroneous; court admonished police practice but affirmed conviction |
| Lost written witness statements (bouncers) and sanctions for discovery violation | Lost statements prejudiced defense and warranted dismissal or greater sanction | Court allowed cross-examination and gave jury a specific instruction that the investigation/handling could be considered; testimony still produced; sanction given permitted defense comment in closing | No unfair prejudice depriving a fair trial; court’s sanction (permitting defense to highlight discovery failure and instructing jury) was not an abuse of discretion |
| Requested jury instruction permitting adverse inference from State’s failure to preserve evidence / playing 911 tape during initial cross-examination | Requested a specific adverse-inference instruction and to play the 911 tape for Detective Jones on initial cross; argued limits interfered with confrontation and favorable-inference argument | Court declined the specific adverse-inference wording (no Maine precedent) but instructed jury they could consider investigation handling and weigh it; limited playing tape initially for judicial economy but allowed recall after tape was introduced | Denial of requested adverse-inference instruction not prejudicial — substance covered by other instructions; limiting playing the tape at that stage was a permissible exercise of trial-management discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Gorman, 854 A.2d 1164 (Me. 2004) (foundational requirements and discretion for admitting recorded recollection under Rule 803(5))
- State v. Mitchell, 4 A.3d 478 (Me. 2010) (standards for admitting alternative-suspect evidence and limits to prevent speculative proof)
- California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (U.S. 1984) (two-part test for when destruction of evidence violates due process)
- State v. Bilynsky, 932 A.2d 1169 (Me. 2007) (adopting Trombetta framework for Maine cases)
- State v. Ouellette, 37 A.3d 921 (Me. 2012) (standards for reviewing denied jury instructions)