815 S.E.2d 415
N.C. Ct. App.2018Background
- In Sept. 2013, Crump and an accomplice robbed patrons at an illegal poker house, stealing phones and IDs; victims later identified property found in a Mustang driven by Crump on Sept. 29, 2013.
- On Sept. 29 police responded to a “bait” poker game; a low-speed pursuit ensued; shots were fired and officers returned fire; Crump was arrested in the Mustang with multiple firearms, spent shells, stolen IDs/cards, and phones in the trunk.
- Grand jury indicted Crump on charges arising from the Sept. 24 robbery and the Sept. 29 shooting, including armed robbery, kidnapping, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill (AWDWIK), assault on an officer with a firearm, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; after trial Crump was convicted of all charges except two counts of assaulting an officer with a firearm.
- At trial Crump testified he fired because he perceived a threat and stipulated to being a convicted felon and to possessing/discharging a firearm on Sept. 29.
- Trial court instructed the jury on self-defense using N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4(1) language (disallowing self-defense if the defendant was attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after a felony), limited voir dire on questions about police shootings/implicit racial bias, and admitted evidence that internal CMPD investigations produced no discipline after Crump’s cross-examination opened that topic.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Crump) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether § 14-51.4(1) requires a causal nexus between the disqualifying felony and the defensive circumstance | § 14-51.4(1) plain language disqualifies self-defense when a defendant was attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after a felony; no causal-nexus requirement needed. | § 14-51.4(1) should be read to require both temporal and causal nexus — felony must have directly and immediately produced the confrontation that caused the defensive use of force. | Court: No causal-nexus requirement in § 14-51.4(1); legislature omitted such language intentionally; affirmed the instruction. |
| 2. Whether including AWDWIK as a disqualifying felony in the instruction was reversible error (circularity) | Inclusion was supported by evidence of felonious conduct and other disqualifying felonies; any circularity was harmless. | Including AWDWIK was circular (it used the offense at issue to disqualify self-defense) and negated the defense. | Court: Concedes circularity but finds it harmless because Crump had stipulated to felony possession of a firearm and thus was not entitled to self-defense instruction in any event. |
| 3. Whether trial court abused discretion by prohibiting voir dire questions about a recent police-shooting case and implicit racial bias (so-called “stake-out” questions) | Restricting such questions was proper where they would be impermissible stake-out/hypothetical questions and possibly confusing; exhaustion of peremptory challenges not required to review. | Denial of this voir dire line prevented probing juror bias about police shootings/race and impaired exercise of cause and peremptory challenges; prejudicial error. | Court: On these specific facts (Crump apparently did not know he shot at police until later), no prejudicial error. Court warns trial judges to take care when limiting racial-bias voir dire; permitting such inquiry may be appropriate when tied to issues in the case. |
| 4. Whether State could rebut by introducing that internal CMPD investigations produced no discipline after defendant opened the door | State may rebut or explain in fairness when defendant’s cross-examination raises inferences about officer motive or potential alteration of statements; admission was proper once defendant opened the door. | Results of internal investigations are hearsay and inadmissible unless an exception applies; trial court erred. | Court: No error — defendant opened the door during cross-examination, so the State permissibly elicited that no discipline resulted. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Barron, 202 N.C. App. 686 (2010) (standards for reviewing jury instructions)
- State v. Castaneda, 196 N.C. App. 109 (2009) (prejudicial error standard for jury-instruction error)
- State v. Reid, 335 N.C. 647 (1994) (gratuitous self-defense instructions are favorable to defendant and non-prejudicial if defendant not entitled to instruction)
- State v. Gregory, 340 N.C. 365 (1995) (purpose of voir dire to identify cause challenges and permit intelligent use of peremptory challenges)
- State v. Jones, 347 N.C. 193 (1997) (prohibition on hypothetical or “stake-out” voir dire questions that ask jurors to pledge how they would decide before evidence/instructions)
- State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563 (1984) ("opening the door" doctrine: when defendant introduces evidence suggesting an inference, State may rebut or explain)
- State v. Holloman, 369 N.C. 615 (2017) (statutory interpretation principles; plain meaning controls)