State v. Crump, 84001366DI

Benjamin Crump was convicted in 1984 of first‑degree kidnapping and first‑degree rape; the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed his conviction in 1985 and 1989 on appeal and on initial postconviction review.
Crump filed a first Rule 61 postconviction motion in 1988 raising multiple ineffective‑assistance and evidentiary claims; it was denied and affirmed on appeal.
The Innocence Project arranged DNA testing in 2003 on a pubic‑comb recovered from the victim; forensic reports identified spermatozoa and concluded the DNA did not exonerate Crump.
In May 2015 the U.S. Department of Justice notified Crump that an FBI hair‑analysis examiner’s trial testimony exceeded the limits of the science and contained errors.
Crump filed a pro se second Rule 61 motion in June 2015 asserting the FBI hair‑analysis testimony was scientifically invalid and that trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging it; counsel later sought to withdraw, stating the DNA identification from the comb cured any prejudice from the hair evidence.
The Superior Court denied the second Rule 61 motion as untimely and repetitive, and granted defense counsel’s motion to withdraw on ethical grounds.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Crump)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether the 2015 Rule 61 motion is timely	Motion challenges new scientific infirmities in FBI hair testimony; DOJ letter is new evidence warranting review	Conviction became final in 1985; motion filed 2015 — beyond Rule 61 one‑year limit	Denied as untimely under Rule 61(i)(1)
Whether the motion is successive/repetitive and fits an exception	DOJ letter is new evidence creating a strong inference of actual innocence (or at least invalidating hair evidence)	Motion is a second Rule 61 filing; DNA from comb positively identifies Crump, so DOJ letter does not create strong inference of actual innocence	Denied as repetitive under Rule 61(i)(2); exceptions not satisfied
Whether counsel may ethically withdraw from representing Crump on postconviction claims	Crump opposes withdrawal, argues counsel should pursue hair‑analysis claim and possible retrial relief	Counsel contends hair testimony error is immaterial because DNA from spermatozoa links Crump to the assault; no substantial ground remains to advance	Granted: counsel may withdraw under Rule 61(e)(7) because no substantial ground exists and ethical advocacy is impossible

Crump v. State, 505 A.2d 452 (Del. 1985) (direct appeal affirming conviction)
Crump v. State, 567 A.2d 420 (Del. 1989) (affirming denial of initial Rule 61 relief)
State v. Reyes, 155 A.3d 331 (Del. 2017) (Rule 61 claim‑by‑claim analysis required)
Bradley v. State, 135 A.3d 748 (Del. 2016) (outlining Rule 61 procedural bars and standards)