State v. Crowley
320 P.3d 677
Utah Ct. App.2014Background
- Defendant Joseph Brandon Crowley pawned an iPod about two weeks after it was stolen; pawnshop records (including a signed slip and fingerprint) identified him as the seller.
- Police matched the pawnshop fingerprint to Crowley and the victim reported the iPod stolen; Crowley was charged with theft by receiving stolen property and theft by deception.
- At trial the State conceded it could not prove Crowley actually stole the iPod and relied on a statutory presumption that possession of recently stolen property, without a satisfactory explanation, is prima facie evidence the possessor stole it (Jury Instruction 33/83).
- Crowley objected that the instruction shifted the burden to him and implicated his right to remain silent; the trial court overruled the objection and added a sentence saying the presumed fact must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
- The jury convicted on both counts; Crowley appealed arguing the instruction created an unconstitutional mandatory presumption that relieved the State of its burden to prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt.
- The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding the instruction created a mandatory presumption and the error was not harmless because the State’s case depended on the presumption to prove Crowley’s knowledge/belief that the iPod was stolen.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Instruction 33 impermissibly shifted burden of proof by creating a mandatory presumption that possession of recently stolen property implies the possessor stole it | Instruction 33, with the additional sentence that the presumed fact must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, preserves the State’s burden and does not create an unconstitutional presumption | Instruction 33 (quoting the statute and using "prima facie") creates a mandatory presumption forcing defendant to explain possession or face conviction, shifting burden and implicating the right to remain silent | Reversed: Instruction 33, as given, created an unconstitutional mandatory presumption that relieved the State of proving an element beyond a reasonable doubt; error was not harmless and requires new trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (holding due process forbids mandatory presumptions that relieve the State of burden of persuasion)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (harmless error standard for constitutional errors)
- State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321 (Utah 1985) (statutory language creating prima facie presumption is unconstitutional when used in jury instructions)
- State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1986) (approving permissive-inference wording that avoids mandatory presumption)
- State v. Kelson, 284 P.3d 695 (Utah Ct. App. 2012) (instructs courts to assess jury instructions in context to determine whether a presumption is mandatory or permissive)