State v. Crisoforo Montalvo (077331) (Monmouth and Statewide)
162 A.3d 270
| N.J. | 2017Background
- Late-night noise dispute between upstairs defendant Crisoforo Montalvo and downstairs neighbor Arturs Daleckis escalated: Montalvo broke Daleckis’s small table, then later answered his front door holding a machete he kept in his apartment.
- Montalvo said he retrieved the machete from a closet out of fear for himself, his pregnant wife, and their unborn child, kept it low and behind his leg while speaking, and never left the apartment with it; Daleckis said Montalvo pointed the machete and later the porch showed apparent machete marks.
- Indictment charged Montalvo with (1) possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d)) and (2) unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d)). A separate disorderly-persons criminal mischief charge alleged he broke the table.
- The trial court instructed the jury on Count One (unlawful purpose) including a self-defense instruction, but used the model charge (without self-defense) for Count Two (5(d)); when the jury asked whether self-defense is a lawful use for Count Two, the court read language from State v. Kelly limiting self-defense under §5(d) to spontaneous arming to meet immediate danger.
- Jury acquitted on Count One, convicted on Count Two, and Montalvo appealed; the Appellate Division affirmed, and the New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Montalvo) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defensive possession of a lawful weapon in the home can violate N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d) | §5(d) prohibits possession under circumstances likely to make an object a weapon; here circumstances and machete’s uncommon nature supported conviction | Possessing a lawful weapon in the home for self-defense is protected (Second Amendment); §5(d) cannot criminalize passive defensive possession in the home | Court: Possession of a lawful weapon in the home for self-defense is protected; §5(d) cannot be applied to passive in-home defensive possession without violating that right; reversal required |
| Proper jury instruction on whether self-defense is a lawful use under §5(d) (and applicability of Kelly’s spontaneity rule) | Kelly’s spontaneity rule applies to §5(d): self-defense justifies possession only when one arms oneself spontaneously to meet immediate danger | Kelly is distinguishable; spontaneity rule applies to anticipatory arming outside the home, not to lawful possession in the home for defense | Court: Trial court misapplied Kelly; spontaneity requirement is not applicable to lawful in-home possession for self-defense; instruction was erroneous |
| Whether error was harmless or plain error given lack of objection | Even if instruction imperfect, evidence showed conduct beyond lawful self-defense, so conviction stands | No objection at trial; but the erroneous instruction was capable of producing an unjust result because jury could have convicted on invalid theory | Court: Because jury could have relied on invalid theory (passive in-home possession), error was plain and reversible; remand ordered |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (recognizes individual right to possess weapons in the home for self-defense)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (applies Second Amendment protections to the States)
- State v. Kelly, 118 N.J. 370 (1990) (held self-defense under §5(d) justified only when arming was spontaneous to meet immediate danger; applied to anticipatory arming outside the home)
- State v. Harmon, 104 N.J. 189 (1986) (held §5(d) self-defense exception narrow — rare, momentary spontaneous arming)
- State v. Lee, 96 N.J. 156 (discusses three classes of possessory weapons offenses and §5(d) scope)
- State in Interest of G.C., 179 N.J. 475 (explains §5(d) applies to threats to persons or property and guides manifestly appropriate analysis)
- Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (reasoning that reliance on an invalid ground can vitiate a conviction)